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REGULATORY DIFFUSION
Jennifer Nou & Julian Nyarko†
Abstract. Regulatory diffusion occurs when an agency adopts a
substantially similar rule to that of another agency. Indeed, regulatory texts
proliferate just like other forms of law like constitutions, statutes, and contracts
do. While this insight has been explored across countries, this dynamic also
occurs closer to home: American administrative agencies regularly borrow
language from one another. By our measure, in recent years, agencies reused
one out of every ten paragraphs of the Code of Federal Regulations from another
rulemaking. These insights are timely given a recent Supreme Court decision
calling for judges to engage in less deferential regulatory interpretation. As a
result, there is newfound significance as to questions of how legislative rules are
written and why.
This Article explores the descriptive and normative implications of
regulatory diffusion. The empirical analysis reveals a fairly steady rate of text
reuse, with a notable increase during the Trump Administration – perhaps the
result of well-documented staffing problems and vacancies. More generally,
both the number of borrowing and lending agencies has increased, with a
relatively small number of agencies borrowing text from an increasingly larger
group. In other words, regulatory text has diffused from more agencies. This
behavior appears to vary by whether the agency is executive or independent in
nature.
These findings raise important questions about whether such diffusion
is desirable, as well as how to interpret the regulations that result. To assess the
tradeoffs, we propose that rulewriters should be required to explain why they
are emulating other regulatory texts to allow executive branch oversight over
the practice. We also argue in favor of the in pari materia canon—the idea that
similar regulations should be interpreted similarly by judges—and propose ways
for judges to decide when and how to apply it.

†

Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School, respectively. For helpful comments and conversations, many thanks to Ellen
Aprill, Michael Guttentag, William Hubbard, Thomas Miles, Eric Posner, Rachel Potter,
Katherine Pratt, Roberta Romano, Bijal Shah, Charles Shipan, and Jed Stiglitz. Thanks also
to participants in Loyola Law School Faculty Workshop; Northwestern Pritzker Law School
Public Law Colloquium; and the University of Pennsylvania Administrative Power workshop.
Cedric Elkouh, Jacob Pavlecic, Jason Petty, and Mitchell Wong provided superb research
assistance. [More acknowledgments to come.] We are also grateful for the insights of several
anonymous government employees who agreed to be interviewed for this project.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................. 3
I.

Diffusion Trends ................................................................................ 11
A. Measuring Diffusion ................................................................... 12
1. Dataset.................................................................................... 13
2. Identifying Text Reuse ........................................................... 19
B. Analysis ....................................................................................... 24
1. Scope ...................................................................................... 25
2. Leaders and Followers ........................................................... 29

II. Explaining Diffusion .......................................................................... 38
A. Why Diffusion ............................................................................. 39
B. Channels of Diffusion ................................................................. 43
III. Implications ........................................................................................ 47
A. Evaluating Diffusion ................................................................... 47
B. Interpreting Similar Regulations ................................................. 52
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 59
Appendix.................................................................................................... 60
Additional Tables and Figures ................................................................... 66

2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

Introduction
Regulatory texts, like other forms of law, diffuse. They migrate across
administrative agencies in substantially the same form. Agencies, in other words,
borrow rules from one another. The broader phenomenon of legal diffusion is
usually studied as a comparative, international matter.1 Laws are frequently
“transplanted” to foreign arenas.2 Developing countries, this literature suggests,
borrow laws from more developed countries to signal legitimacy, garner
prestige, or preserve resources.3 Sometimes regulations are mimicked to promote
harmonization between member states, such as within the European Union.4
Other times regulatory standards in one country are adopted abroad to indicate
quality or safety to consumers.5
Regulatory diffusion, it turns out, also occurs closer to home. American
administrative agencies borrow the texts of rules from one another. Such
behavior is not merely a cost-saving resort to boilerplate templates, which are
commonly used when agencies draft responses to executive orders.6 Rather,
agencies issuing separate regulations reuse substantive and procedural regulatory
1

See, e.g., Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39
INT’L REV. L. ECON. 1, 1 (2014); Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillén, The
Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999, 70 AM. SOC.
REV. 871, 871–72 (2005); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families
and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1813, 1816 (2009); Jonathan B.
Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds.) 123,
126–131 (2013).
2 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 95 (1974).
3 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal
History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. LAW
839, 846 (2003) (noting that “it is common for developing countries and smaller industrialized
countries to borrow the environmental, health and safety legislation and regulatory standards
of large developed countries” since it “is simply too expensive and a waste of resources for
those countries to develop their own standards, so they turn to a country with prestige in the
legislative field”).
4

See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial Data on
Governance Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEORGE WASH L. REV. 1529, 1663 (2013).
5 See, e.g., Nico van der Heiden & Felix Strebel, What About Non-Diffusion? The Effect of
Competitiveness in Policy-Comparative Diffusion Research, 45 POL. SCIENCES 345, 353-54
(2012); Andrea Barrios Villarreal, Keeping an Eye on What Matters for the Economy, ISO
(Sept. 9, 2019); Regulation and policy diffusion of environmental/food safety standards in
Asia: Challenges for inclusive trade., https://unctad.org/es/node/26123; Louella Desidario,
Exporters Push for Adoption of Safety Chain Standards, PHILSTAR (Sept. 5, 2021 5:00 AM),
https://www.philstar.com/business/2021/09/05/2124873/exporters-push-adoption-supplychain-standards.
6 See Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart & Cheryl Blake, The Problem with Words: Plain
Language and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1358, 1379–80,
1390–92 (2015).
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provisions. One provision is promulgated by an agency, only to be later adopted
in substantially the same form by another.7 The same provision can be mimicked
over decades by dozens of disparate agencies.8
Sometimes this practice is required by Congress or the President.9 Many
times, however, it is not: Agencies, in their discretion, choose to import
regulatory language from another agency’s rulemaking. Consider some
examples:


In 1980, the Department of Education (ED) promulgated Title IX
regulations regarding nondiscrimination on the basis of sex.10 Two
decades later, twenty-one agencies decided to substantially copy
most of ED’s final regulations on Title IX.11 In their “common rule,”
they cited several reasons for doing so, including “the history of
public participation in the development and congressional approval
of ED’s regulations”; ED’s “leadership role” in regulatory
enforcement; the public’s pre-existing familiarity with the
regulations; and an interest in maintaining regulatory consistency.12



In 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13,199
calling for greater inclusion of faith-based organizations in federal

7

See infra Part I.B.
Id.
9 See Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM L. REV. 745, 751 (2011)
(noting that the Securities and Exchange Act directs “agencies to make regulations that are
‘substantially similar’ to those of the SEC”). As a result, “all of these agencies have copied
the SEC’s regulations, and when the SEC amends its regulations, the banking regulators
usually follow.” For discussion of presidential coordination, see infra Part II.A.
10 ED was the successor agency to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which
had originally promulgated the same regulations in 1975. Those regulations were later adopted
by ED when it splintered off in 1980. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance. 65 FR 52,858-52,859 (Aug.
30, 2000). Title IX provides that “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” with certain
exceptions. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a).
11 65 FR 52,858-52,859 (Aug. 30, 2000).
12 Id. At the same time, the agencies took care to note that their regulations were “not identical
to ED’s regulations” in every respect. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs and Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 64 FR 58569-58572
(emphasis added). For example, they noted, “the common rule includes modifications to be
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and statutory changes that are not yet reflected in
the Department of Education’s regulations. In addition . . . the participating agencies have
made a few additional revisions to the common rule in response to public comments.” See
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance, 65 FR 52,858-52,859 (2000).
8
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grants.13 The challenge was how to do so in light of competing
Establishment Clause concerns. Over the following years, a number
of agencies promulgated rules allowing grant funding, but not for
“inherently religious activities such as religious worship,
instruction or proselytization.”14
In 2010, however, President Barack Obama’s Advisory
Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
recommended that agencies replace the term “inherently religious”
because the term was confusing and did not sufficiently indicate the
boundaries of government subsidies.15 That same year, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13,559 using the phrase “explicitly
religious activities” though it did not specifically require any
changes.16 Six years later, nine large federal agencies jointly
changed their funding restrictions to now cover “explicitly religious
activities,” as well as “proselytization” and “religious
instruction.”17Other agencies followed the next year, even after
President Obama left office.18


In 2015, the Department of Commerce proposed revisions to its
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to “enhance clarity and
consistency” with the terms of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulation (ITAR), which is administered by the Department of

13

Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. § 13,199 (Jan. 29, 2001).
See, e.g., Solicitation for Grant Applications; National Farmworker Jobs Program for
Program Year 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 36519, 36523 (July 23, 2009); see also VA Homeless
Providers Grant and Per Diem Program; Religious Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. 31883, 31888
(June 8, 2004); Family Violence Prevention and Services/Grants for Domestic Violence
Shelters/Grants to Native American Tribes (Including Alaska Native Villages) and Tribal
Organizations, 75 Fed. Reg. 14596, 14601 (Mar. 26, 2010)
15
President’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships: A New Era
of Partnerships: Report of Recommendations to the President at 129 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ofbnp-council- final-report.pdf.
16 Exec. Order. 13559, 75 Fed. Reg. 71319, 71320 (Nov. 22, 2010).
17 Federal Agency Final Regulations Implementing Executive Order 13559: Fundamental
Principles and Policymaking Criteria for Partnerships With Faith-Based and Other
Neighborhood Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,353, 19,358 (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-04-04/pdf/2016-07339.pdf.
18 See, e.g., Revolving Loan Fund Program Changes and General Updates to PWEDA
Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 57034, 57051 (Dec. 1, 2017) (noting the change was made “to be
consistent with recent rulemakings by nine other Federal agencies.”).
14
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State.19 The proposed rule imported the definitions of a number of
terms from the ITAR.20
Because the two sets of regulations were issued pursuant to
different statutes and administered by different agencies, the
proposed rule noted that “each set of regulations” had “evolved
separately over decades without much coordination between the
two agencies regarding their structure and content.”21 As a result,
they often used “different words, or the same words differently, to
accomplish similar regulatory objectives.”22 So, to “facilitate
enhanced compliance while reducing unnecessary regulatory
burdens,” the EAR copied the ITAR definitions rather than rework
definitions in concert with the other agency.23
In this manner, regulations diffuse across different agencies, at different times,
and through different channels. While one might expect this dynamic to occur
only between agencies sharing statutory authorities, it occurs between agencies
authorized under different statutes as well.
This phenomenon raises a host of questions, both descriptive and normative:
What motivates the borrowing of regulatory texts? Do drafters simply seek to
save time and resources? Or are these efforts to standardize regulatory language
and reduce compliance costs? Through what mechanisms does diffusion occur:
interagency working groups, staff migration, centralized coordination? Are some
agencies more influential leaders in drafting regulatory texts than others? More
broadly, what networks exist across agencies when writing rules? And what are
the implications, if any, for regulatory process and interpretation?
These inquiries lie at the intersection of a number of rich literatures.
Comparative scholars, as mentioned, have long examined how and why laws are
“transplanted” across different jurisdictions.24 Some of this work studies the
migration of legal rules without regard to their form, whether case law, statutes,

19

Revisions to Definitions in the Export Administration Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 31505,
31505 (June 3, 2015) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, 750, 764, 772).
20 Id. The number imported definitions for terms including: “technology,” “required,”
“peculiarly responsible,” “proscribed person,” “published,” results of “fundamental research,”
“export,” “reexport,” “release,” “transfer,” and “transfer (incountry).” See id.
21 Id. at 31505-06.
22 Id. at 31506.
23 Id. at 31505; see also Revisions to Definitions in the Export Administration Regulations,
81 Fed. Reg. 35586, 35587 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, 750,
772).
24 See WATSON, supra note 2. One vein of this work, for example, compares civil and common
law systems, with some finding that corporate laws disperse from core to periphery countries
within those systems. See, e.g., Spamann, supra note 1 at 1816 (empirically observing the
“diffusion of law along legal family lines”).
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or otherwise.25 Social scientists have also long studied the broader notion of
“policy diffusion,” the “spread of [policy] innovations from one government to
another.”26 Work in this area has mainly focused on policy choices adopted by
legislative bodies and how they spread, “while ignoring the equally important
decisions made by executive agencies.”27 Relatedly, some have focused more
specifically on the extent to which state statutory texts are “reused” or copied
verbatim by other state legislatures.28 Contract law scholars, for their part, have
long studied the use of boilerplate and drafting templates—how copied
contractual terms proliferate and through what channels.29
These themes have yet to be explored in the context of U.S. administrative
agencies. One reason may be the previous regime of strong judicial deference to
agency regulatory interpretation.30 As a result, there was little need to consider
how and why agencies draft regulations. That is no longer the case.31 We suspect
See, e.g., id. at 1818 (“systematically trac[ing] visible foreign influence—citations, the
involvement of foreign-trained lawyers, and evidence of outright copying of statutes—in the
major corporate law treatises and the drafting histories of securities and corporate law statutes
of thirty-two peripheral and semi-peripheral countries . . . .”).
26 See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. P OL.
SCI. 840, 841 (2008); see also Steven J. Balla, Interstate Professional Associations and the
Diffusion of Policy Innovations, 29 AM. POL. RESEARCH 221, 229–33, 235–43 (2001); Robert
L. Crain, Fluoridation: The Diffusion of an Innovation Among Cities, 44 SOC. FORCES 467,
467–76 (1966); Lawrence J. Grossback, Sean Nicholson-Crotty & David A.M. Peterson,
Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion, 32 AM. POL. RESEARCH 521, 521–45 (2004).
27 See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and
Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788, 793 (2012) (observing that “nearly all policy
diffusion studies explore legislative adoption by state or national governments, while ignoring
the equally important decisions made by executive agencies”).
28 See, e.g., Matthew Burgess, Eugenia Giraudy, Julian Katz-Samuels, Joe Walsh, Derek
Willis, Lauren Haynes & Rayid Ghani, The Legislative Influence Detector: Finding Text
Reuse in State Legislation,” KDD ’16: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining KDD 2016 57-66, 57 (2016); see also
John Wilkerson, David Smith & Nicholas Stramp, Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in
Legislatures: A Text Reuse Approach, 59 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 943, 943 (2015) (analyzing
provision reuse from federal bills to law).
29 The literature provides competing accounts, ranging from those that allege widespread reuse
without reflection to those that suggest profound edits to past contracts, if only to increase the
attorneys’ profits. For an overview, see, e.g., Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete
Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2021); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient
Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEORGE WASH. LAW REV. 57 (2017); MITU GULATI &
ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE
LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 2-5 (2013); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The
Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L. J. 1–78 (2017).
30 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (calling for judges to
give “controlling weight” to an agency interpretation so long as it is not “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.”); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).(applying the
same standard).
31 See infra Part III.B.
25
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that another reason is the until-recent lack of access to machine-readable versions
of the Federal Register.32 Earlier work on agency behavior used data drawn
almost exclusively from the Unified Agenda33 — a semiannual publication of
agencies’ planned activities.34 The Unified Agenda essentially consists of selfreported data on planned regulatory activities, which some research now
suggests are incomplete.35 Agencies, however, are legally required to publish
their final rules in the Federal Register.36 Data drawn from the Federal Register
thus provide the most comprehensive portrait of agency rulemaking available.
At the same time, administrative law scholars have increasingly studied the
ways in which agencies relate to each other. This work has documented that these
interactions can be demanded and designed by the President or Congress.37 Other

See Ed O’Keefe, Federal Register Makes Itself More Web-Friendly, WASH. POST,
(October 5, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/10/04/AR2009100402533.html/ (announcing, in October 2009 that
the Federal Register “will be available at Data.gov in a form known in the Web world as
XML, which allows users to transport data from a Web site and store it, reorganize it or
customize it elsewhere”).
33 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, U.S. General Services,
Administration,
https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/federal-regulationpolicy/unified-agenda-of-federal-regulatory-and-deregulatory-actions.; see also, e.g., Alex
Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect
and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443, 450 (2013)
34
See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Political Control, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Public
Commenting on Agency Regulations, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 524, 536 n.12 (2014); Jack M.
Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 319 n.108
(2013).
35. See Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L.
REV. 733, 755–56 (2016); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 L. CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 198 n.41 (Spring 1994) (noting that his investigation into the quality of the Unified
Agenda data was “sufficiently disappointing that [he did] not pursue[] the analysis on a more
‘scientific’ basis”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 927 n.108 (2008) (“[T]he
Unified Agenda data are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”).
36 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2000) (“The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be
made not less than 30 days before its effective date.”).
37 See, e.g., Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 74647 (2011) (examining how the “political branches take advantage of and shape . . . agencyagency relationships”); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138–45, 1173 (2012); Anne Joseph O’Connell
& Daniel A. Farber, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1375 , 1385-86 (2017)
(exploring conflict between agencies that is created by Congress “through delegation and
appointment restrictions, “ by the White House “by directives,” and “[o]n occasion, [by] the
agencies and the courts.”); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 218-42
(2015).
32
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times, these interactions are “interagency,” 38 that is, decisions by agencies
themselves to coordinate or clash.39 Much of this nuanced scholarship
illuminates through extended case studies and examples. In addition, it often
focuses on formal legal mechanisms, such as statutes or executive orders,
interagency memoranda, and jointly issued policy statements and guidelines.40
While these approaches have yielded rich insights, they have granted less
attention to patterns of agency interaction, informal relationships, and the ways
in which inter-agency connections are structured. They underappreciate, in other
words, the importance of agency networks.41 As a result, it may be more difficult
to understand how agencies exercise power by virtue of their positions within
networks and how cohesive those networks are. For example, some agencies are
highly influential rule drafters: when they write a regulation, other agencies
follow.42 Similarly, some agencies are central network players and interact with
a great number of other agencies.43 Our analysis begins to shed light on some of
these and related dynamics.
More broadly, this Article considers the phenomenon of regulatory diffusion
as both a positive and normative matter. Part I analyzes twenty years of data
drawn from the Federal Register using text and network analysis. These tools
have long been staples of social science and public administration research,44 but

38

See Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 184-85 (2013)
(“Today, agencies routinely solicit input from other agencies, and agencies routinely offer
their recommendations unsolicited when doing so is in their interests.”).
39 See, e.g., O’Connell & Farner, supra note 37, at 1390-92; Bijal Shah, Uncovering
Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 807–30 (2015).
40 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1161; see, e.g., Teresa M. Schwartz, Protecting
Consumer Health and Safety: The Need for Coordinated Regulation Among Federal Agencies,
43. GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1033-41, 1054-62 (1975), Jason Marisam, Duplicative
Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 190-98 (2011).
41 See John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn, Network Theory and Political Science in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL NETWORKS (eds. Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H.
Montgomery, and Mark Lubell 147 (2017) (“The fundamental allure of network theory is its
ability to describe and analyze the structure of connections between units . . . in a rigorous but
flexible way”).
42 See infra Part I.B.2.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Sharon S. Dawes, Anthony M. Cresswell, & Theresa A. Pardo, From “Need to
Know” to “Need to Share”: Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of
Public Sector Knowledge Networks, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 392 , 392-93 (2009); Benny Hjern
& David. O. Porter, Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis, 2
ORG. STUD. 211, 211, 220, 223 (1981). For overviews, see Jesse D. Lecy, Ines A. Mergel &
Hans Peter Schmitz, Networks in Public Administration: Current Scholarship in Review, 16
PUB. MANAGEMENT. REV. 643 (2013); Michael D. Ward, Katherine Stovel & Audrey Sacks,
Network Analysis and Political Science, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 245 (2011); Patty & Penn,
supra note 41.
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have yet to be deployed robustly in the administrative law literature.45 Our
findings suggest that the share of reused texts has increased over time, from less
than 3% in 2000 to more than 10% by 2020—more than a threefold increase.
Strikingly, as of 2020, one out of every ten new regulatory paragraphs was
borrowed from a previously published regulation.
In addition, both the number of borrowing and lending agencies has
increased. The rise in lending agencies is much steeper than the increase in
borrowing agencies. This suggests that the network of diffusion has dispersed
through the years, with a relatively small number of agencies borrowing text
from an increasingly large group of agencies. In other words, regulatory text has
diffused from more agencies over time. Some leaders – agencies whose texts are
often copied by others --include the Department of Treasury and Office of
Management and Budget. The agencies that follow, or borrow, the most include
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Agriculture.
Moreover, this Article also reveals that independent agencies borrow
disproportionately from other independent agencies, while executive agencies do
not. Perhaps independent agencies “trust” texts from their counterparts as
somehow more worthy of diffusion, more expert, and less subject to political
change compared to executive agencies. After all, independent agencies are
structured to be more isolated from presidential whim. Alternatively,
independent agencies as a group may share more common regulatory problems
or challenges relative to more disparate executive agencies.
Part II turns to potential explanations for some of these trends and findings.
It considers possible reasons why drafting agencies would want to borrow texts
from a another agency— springboards for various hypotheses we hope to test in
future work. For example, diffusion may occur because agencies have learned
from other agencies about successful policies or drafting choices. Alternatively,
perhaps regulatory drafters are driven by resource constraints, in which case one
would expect to see variation with changes in budgets and staffing. Another
possibility is that interest may play a central role in drafting and disseminating
regulatory text — much as they do in the legislative arena. Drawing on
interviews with government officials, we also consider some of the channels
through which regulations diffuse. We identify informal methods of interaction
between agencies and consider the behavior and incentives of regulatory drafters.
Finally, Part III considers some of the normative implications of diffusion
on regulatory process and interpretation. In particular, it argues that agencies
should be under a duty to explain why they borrowed a text from another
agency’s rulemaking. This explanation should then be subject to judicial and
political oversight to ensure that the text reuse occurred for desirable rather than
See, e.g., Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. REG. 274, 276 (2020). While
network analysis is just beginning to make its way into administrative law scholarship, there
has been some excellent recent work using text analysis on the Federal Register. See, e.g.,
Cary Coglianese, Gabe Scheffler and Daniel Walters, Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. 885, 893
(2021).
45
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undesirable reasons. Moreover, the question of how agencies draft regulations
has newfound significance given a recent Supreme Court decision,46 which
effectively calls for judges to interpret regulatory texts with less deference to the
agency.47 As a result, judges will be increasingly faced with the question of
whether to interpret similar regulations issued by different agencies in para
materia, that is, by reference to one another. This Part argues that the canon is
appropriate in the regulatory context and proposes some ways for judges to
decide when and how to apply it. In addition, the analysis considers the tradeoffs
between different mechanisms that agencies could use to update policies created
under borrowed texts.
I.

Diffusion Trends

Regulatory diffusion, as understood here, refers to the use of substantially
similar codified texts across agencies.48 With this focus, we are interested in two
related phenomena: (1) the interagency spread of policy choices and (2) the reuse
of regulatory language. Policy diffusion, of course, can occur even when
agencies write their regulations differently. When agencies reuse regulatory texts
from other agencies, however, they are often adopting the same policies reflected
in them. In other words, regulatory texts serve as an “aggregate representation”
of various dimensions including the “domain of the policy, the ideological
position enacted by the policy, the level of specificity in the policy enactment,
and several other salient features of policy that are communicated through the
text.”49 To be sure, when the regulatory text is ambiguous, some of the policy
choices contained therein are as well. What is important to appreciate, however
is that the phenomenon we study here implicates both agency policy choices as
well as their drafting decisions.
Regulatory diffusion, in turn, can occur in different forms: through joint,
common, or what we will call “successive” rulemaking. Sometimes, agencies
issue “joint” regulations, resulting in a single rule signed by the relevant agencies
and codified in the same place in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).50 In
46

See Kisor v. Wilkie. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019).
Id.
48 At issue is the operative text as codified in the CFR, not the preambles and analyses
accompanying it.
49 Fridolin Linder, Bruce Desmarais, Matthew Burgess, & Eugenia Giraudy, Text as Policy:
Measuring Policy Similarity through Bill Text Reuse, 48 POL’Y STUD. J. 546, 549 (2018).
47

Freeman’s & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1165-66 (describing “joint rules” as
“typically [when] two or more agencies agree[] to adopt a single regulatory preamble
and text”). “The agencies might produce either a single rule with a series of signature
pages from the participating agencies, which is codified in one place in the Code of
Federal Regulations (a “joint” rule).” Id. at 1166. Consider a 1995 rule issued by the
Federal Reserve and the Department of Treasury, requiring enhanced recordkeeping
related to certain wire transfers. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations
50
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these instances, the regulatory text diffuses during the drafting process,
culminating in a single rulemaking. Agencies also issue highly similar rules that
are published in their respective sections of the CFR—often referred to as
“common” rules.51 Like joint rules, the diffusion of drafting choices can occur
prior to the issuance of the common rule.
Of most interest here, agencies can also reuse the texts of published rules
from other agencies. In this “successive” context, agencies mirror the texts of
other agencies months or years after they were first promulgated. In the Title IX
rulemaking discussed above, for instance, recall that a group of agencies copied
the Department of Education’s rules more than twenty years after they were first
promulgated.52 This form of diffusion is perhaps the most striking, since it
suggests channels of interagency interaction beyond the more familiar
mechanisms of interagency working groups or centralized coordination through
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
In this Part, we consider how to observe and measure similarity between
regulatory texts. Using that measure, we then present an initial portrait of
regulatory diffusion across agencies and over time. Our analysis suggests that
the reuse of regulatory text is a phenomenon that has drastically increased in
significance over time. Not only has the share of all reused text increased over
time, but so have the number of agencies that participate in text reuse.
A.

Measuring Diffusion

Until recently, empirical research on legal diffusion has relied on handcoded datasets of limited scope.53 Specifically, a jurisdiction’s adoption of
another’s policy was coded as evidence of diffusion. This approach is necessarily
limited in scope, however, given inevitable limits on human capital and
resources. By contrast, we take an automated, “text-as-data” approach to the
analysis of regulatory text. This approach vastly increases the volume of data
available, as well as the level of sophistication with which it can be analyzed.
Relating to Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by
Financial Institutions, 60 FR 220 (January 3, 1995). While, both agencies “jointly . .
. adopted a final rule,” the text was only recorded in the Treasury’s portion of the
CFR. Id.
An illustration is the previously-described Title IX common rule issued by twenty-one
agencies and then codified in their respective sections of the CFR. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text. Like much else in rulemaking, these terms—“joint” and “common”
rules—are not standardized. Some agencies use them interchangeably. Consider a 1994 rule
issued by HUD and the Department of Agriculture. 59 FR at 22220. Under the Action header
in the Federal Registry entry, the agencies list “Final common rule.” Id. The very next line, in
the summary section, then states “[t]his document is the joint final rule.” Id.
52 See supra notes 10-12and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Christopher Z. Mooney & Mei-Hsein Lee, Legislative Morality in the American
States: The Case of pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 599, 612–614
(1995). Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 306–308 (2006).
51
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The first section describes our dataset and methods for identifying diffusion
between agencies. The next section then provides some broad trends in the data,
while shedding light on the agencies that are the most influential in providing
regulatory text.
1.

Dataset

Regulations must be published in the Federal Register (FR) to have legal
effect.54 The Federal Register is the government’s official daily publication for,
among other things, proposed and final rules.55 Those final rules are then codified
into the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) on a quarterly rotating basis by CFR
title.56 Both the FR and CFR are electronically available in XML format.57 Given
its more organized structure, the CFR may initially seem like the best source for
tracking regulatory diffusion. The CFR contains fifty titles according to broad
subject-matter categories, divided into chapters, parts, and sections.58 As relevant
here, the sections typically contains “[o]ne provision of program/function
rules.”59 These sections, in turn, can be broken into paragraphs separated by
paragraph breaks.60 Thus, one could just compare changes to the CFR over time.
The Federal Register, however, has many advantages for understanding
regulatory diffusion. These advantages outweigh the drawbacks, including the
more discretionary ways in which agencies publish regulatory amendments in
it.61 First, unlike the CFR, the FR provides the precise date on which a rule was
54

Federal Register Act § 1510.
Federal Register, 1936 to Present, Federal Register, (March 17, 2021),
https://www.govinfo.gov/help/fr.
56 Specifically, the updating occurs four times a year by CFR title. About the Code of Federal
Regulations, GOVINFO, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/cfr (archived __).
57 See XML now available for ecfr.gov, Office of the Federal Register Blog (),
https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids/office-of-the-federal-register-blog/2015/08/xmlnow-available-for-ecfr-gov (archived _____).
58 Standard Organization of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2018); see
also Richard J. McKinney, A Research Guide to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal
Regulations, L. LIBR. SOC’Y OF WASHINGTON, D.C. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.llsdc.org/frcfr-research-guide [https://perma.cc/5QUD-R6Y8] (showing the sub-organization of the
titles). The chapter designation usually contains the rules of the issuing agency and often bears
the agency’s name. Daniel Stoehr, Understanding the Structure of the Code of Federal
Regulations,
DANIELS
TRAINING
SERVS.
(Feb.
11,
2012),
https://danielstraining.com/understanding-the-structure-of-the-code-of-federal-regulations/
[https://perma.cc/5TKF-XT4G]. The part, in turn, represents a set of rules concerning a single
function. Id.
59
Federal
Register
Tutorial,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/tutorial/online-html.html#CFR
[https://perma.cc/U2LB-QSSH].
60
Document Drafting Handbook p. 3-32. https://www.archives.gov/files/federalregister/write/handbook/ddh.pdf.
61 Specifically, agencies that amend the CFR typically reproduce the amended text of the
regulation in the FR. The text that is reproduced in the FR is commonly limited to the
55
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published. We are thus able to determine what day text borrowing occurs, and
can explore temporal variation and trends over time. Second, the CFR does not
clearly designate which agencies are associated with particular rules, whereas
the FR does.62 Finally, the electronic version of the FR includes rich metadata in
a structured format: For example, associated agencies and sub-agencies,
statutory authorities, rule summaries, and much more.63 For all these reasons,
our dataset was created from the electronic version of the FR, rather than the
CFR.
Specifically, we scrape the regulatory text and associated metadata for every
entry published in the Federal Register over a twenty-year period, between

individual paragraph that has been amended. However, if an agency intends to make revisions
to multiple paragraphs within a section, it lies in the agency’s discretion to instead revise the
entire section and reproduce it in the FR. “For extensive changes, revise the text in full rather
than prepare fragmentary amendments. This will reduce the likelihood of mistakes and the
reader will then have the complete text of the amended unit.” See Document Drafting
Handbook ch. 3.14, p.3-37. Although the handbook directs agencies to revise sections in full,
we state that determining the unit of revision lies in the agencies’ discretion since they can
determine whether the changes are “extensive” enough to warrant a full revision.
This implies that not every paragraph appearing in the FR was necessarily subject to a textual
amendment. We note, however, that this does not affect our analysis of regulatory diffusion
beyond the limitations discussed below, infra Part I.B.1 In addition, we note that, under
exceptional circumstances, amendments to the CFR are not accompanied by a reproduction of
the regulatory text in the FR at all. In particular, if the amendment is a minimal revision,
agencies can fully detail their amendment in the amendatory instructions associated with each
amendment. To give an illustrative example, in 2002, the Department of Health and Human
Services amended § 419.66 using the following instructions: “In § 419.66, paragraph (c)(1) is
amended by adding the phrase ‘or by any category previously in effect’ after ‘categories’ and
before ‘and.’” Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment
System and Calendar Year 2003 Payment Rates; and Changes to Payment Suspension for
Unfiled Cost Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,717, 66,813 (Nov. 1, 2002), at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2002-11-01/02-27548 (download pdf, search pdf
page 97). These examples, however, are exceedingly rare. Indeed, we confirm that 97.1% of
amendments reproduce at least the amended paragraph in the FR.
62 Govinfo, Federal Register, 1936 to the present, https://www.govinfo.gov/help/fr (describing
how the “Table of Contents and Preliminary Pages” section of the “Federal Register contains
a comprehensive alphabetical listing by agency name of all documents in the issue.”).
63 In addition to the text of the paragraph, we collect additional information. This data includes
(1) the part, title and section number of the amended text; (2) the number of words of the
regulatory text; (3) the names of all the participating agencies and subagencies; (3) the
statutory authority; (4) the subject; (5) the amendatory instructions (a brief description
summarizing amendments); (6) the summary description; (7) the publication date; and (8) the
heading where available. Based on the number of participating agencies, we further determine
whether (9) the amendment occurred as part of a joint rulemaking. Based on the summary text,
we determine whether (10) the amendment to the CFR is a republication of a previously
existing rule. We do this simply by looking for the string “republish” in the lowercased
summary text.

14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2020.64 We isolate those final rules that
amend regulatory text in the CFR, which yielded a total of 36,042 final rules
during our period of observation.65 However, the appropriate unit of analysis is
not necessarily the entire rule itself, which can vary greatly in length and scope.66
When two rules exhibit text reuse, only certain portions are usually copied from
the other. So, by splitting the rule into paragraphs, a practice consistent with
previous work in the literature,67 we are able to specify a finer level of granularity
at which to identify text reuse. Using larger units of analysis such as the section
or part, by contrast, would risk missing meaningful examples of diffusion.
Note that this measure does not capture all instances of regulatory
borrowing, since an agency could simply cross-reference another agency’s
regulation rather than incorporate the text into its own.68 However, this practice
of cross-referencing is explicitly prohibited by regulation, except for a few

64

Every entry in the Federal Register API includes a url referring to the associated xml file.
We wrote a scraper to automatically extract the text and other information from these xml
files. We obtain the metadata through the Federal Register API, available here:
https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/documentation/api/v1.
65 We first started with all of the entries under the “Rule” designation. In total, this process
yields 77,944 entries. However, not every entry designated as a “Rule” enters or amends the
regulatory text in the CFR, such as interpretive rules. In addition, many amendments to the
CFR are limited to a change in the statutory authority and not the actual regulatory text.
66 See Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Regulatory Bundling, 128 YALE L. J. 1174, 1190–
91 (2018).
67
See, e.g., Gloria T. Lau, Haoyi Wang & Kincho H. Law, Locating Related Regulations
Using a Comparative Analysis Approach, Proceedings of the 2006 international conference
on Digital government research 231 (May 2006), https://doi.org/10.1145/1146598.1146662
(“[A] section from one set of regulation is compared with another section from another set.”].
68 Inter-agency cross-referencing is distinct from the phenomenon known as “incorporation
by reference.” See Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age,
36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 133 (2013) (defining “incorporation by reference [as] . . .
the practice oof codifying material published elsewhere by simply referring to it in the text of
a regulation.”). Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389,
401-02 (2003) (noting agency incorporation by reference of codes and standards created by
private organizations). This phrase generally refers to a practice in which agencies adopt
standards written by private standard development organizations (SDOs). Bremer, supra at
150. These SDOs are often made up of industry participants. The most influential SDOs
include the American Society for Testing and Materials, the American National Standards
Institute and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Id. The practice has
come under fire because agencies do not publish the actual texts of these standards in the CFR
due to readability and copyright concerns. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards
Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 506-07 (2013). Rather, they
only codify references to material published elsewhere. Id. at 507. As a result, this form of
regulatory diffusion unfortunately does not appear in our dataset, which only picks up the
actual texts themselves—all the more reason to support reforms designed to increase the
transparency of such rules.
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narrow exceptions.69 As the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register
explained when promulgating the rule, cross-references make the Federal
Register “difficult to use” since readers would have to constantly refer to
different sources.70 They also frustrate the purpose of the Federal Register Act,
which is to furnish “the orderly giving of notice” regarding regulatory
requirements.71 Moreover, cross-references also create “procedural problems for
an agency” since it would require the referencing agency to surrender control to
the referenced agency over future amendments to the regulation.72 As a result,
cross-references in the Code of Federal Regulations could become irrelevant or
obsolete.73
With this limitation in mind, we collect the text of every CFR amendment
contained in the FR at the paragraph level. This results in 1,578,332 paragraphs.74
Some paragraphs, however, do not contain content relevant to our study: For
example, the text may consist of framing, structural or otherwise boilerplate
language—that is, language we cannot be confident reflects a conscious decision
to specify the nature of legal obligations.75 More generally, we assume that a
regulatory paragraph is significant only if it contains a substantive or procedural
policy choice.76 So, we seek to exclude paragraphs like the following: “[F]or
See 1 C.F.R. § 21.21 (“Each agency shall publish its own regulations in full text. Crossreferences to the regulations of another agency may not be used as a substitute for publication
in full text” unless they fall into a number of narrow exceptions). These exceptions are for
when
the
reference
is
(1)
“required by court order, statute, Executive order or reorganization plan”; (2) “to regulations
promulgated by an agency with the exclusive legal authority”; (3) “informational”; (4) “to test
methods or consensus standards”; and (5) “to the Department level from a subagency.” Id.
70 See Administrative Committee of the Federal Register, Updating of Publication Procedures,
50 Fed. Reg. 12462, 12462 (March 28, 1985).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 12463.
73 Id.
74 Overall, our initial dataset contains 1,753,458 paragraphs. However, not all paragraphs
represent meaningful text. For instance, in order to indicate that a paragraph in a series of
paragraphs has not been revised agencies at times simply use the symbols “* * *” instead of
reproducing the full text. Other revised paragraphs may consist simply of tables. We isolate
paragraphs containing regulatory text by dropping from the dataset all observations for which
the text contains fewer than 20 characters (including spaces) and the proportion of special
characters to letters is less or equal to 30%. After this process, we are left with 1,578,332
paragraphs.
75 West’s Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary (William P. Statsky, 1985) defines boilerplate as,
“[s]tandard language in legal documents that is identical in documents of a like nature;” see
also Jeremy McClane, Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking, 72
VAND. L. REV. 191, 208-09 (2019).
76 Our motivation for distinguishing texts stems from our study’s objective, which is to better
understand the dynamics underlying the diffusion of regulatory text. It is difficult to assume
intentionality or coordination when a great number of agencies adopts the same boilerplate
text. It is more likely that the text reflects a standardization of necessary, structural
69
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purposes of this section the following definitions apply,” or “the following terms
used in this part are defined as follows.” Our efforts on this front are consistent
with the broader diffusion literature.77
To be sure, the lines between those paragraphs we consider significant and
those we do not will not always be clear; there will be borderline cases. A human
cannot feasibly read and code the more than one million paragraphs in our dataset
within a reasonable period of time. We thus employ a supervised machinelearning classification approach,78 which automates and disciplines the
identification of significant paragraphs. We begin by hand-labeling a sample of
400 paragraphs for whether they meet our definition of significance or not. After
balancing the labeled data,79 we divide it into a training set and a test set.80 We

information. Even more importantly, we are normatively interested in the spread of policy
choices across agencies. We thus must exclude observations that arguably do not express a
policy choice, whether a substantive or procedural legal obligation.
77 We are not the first to attempt to distinguish between different variations of relevant and
irrelevant text (where “relevance” is defined relative to the purpose of the study). For instance,
in a study of policy diffusion, researchers examine text reuse in bills introduced by U.S. state
legislatures. Fridolin Linder et al., Text as Policy: Measuring Policy Similarity through Bill
Text Reuse, 48 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 546, 574 (2020). In order to isolate and omit
“boilerplate,” they create a formula that turns to the breadth of use across documents.
Intuitively, the authors assume that text appearing in a great number of bills is indicative of
boilerplate, whereas text that appears in relatively few bills suggests policy relevance. Id. at
556. They then specify a cutoff, dropping text that is used too broadly. Id. at 553. In our view,
however, this approach is not suited in this specific application for two primary reasons. First,
while the breadth in use likely characterizes many of our non-substantive terms, it does not
fully map onto our definition of “significant” paragraphs. Second, the approach proposed by
Linder et al. lacks verification. Although it might be suitable to identify some types of nonsubstantive text, we simply do not know whether this is the case without coding a large,
random sample of paragraphs by hand and comparing the automated approach against the
hand labels. At the same time, if one is willing to create a hand labeled dataset, these hand
labels can be used more efficiently than to verify a rules-based classification scheme. And
indeed, this is the approach we take.
78 This decision is consistent with a growing number of studies utilizing a computational
analysis of legal texts. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting out of the Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUMBIA
LAW REV. 1075, 11121-123 (2017); David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A
Computational Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL LAW REV. 1, 16, 20
(2019); Jonathan H. Choi, An Empirical Study of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, 95 N.
Y. UNIV. LAW REV. 363, 382-89 (2020); Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete Contracts,
88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (2021).
79 Since we have significantly fewer substantive than non-substantive labels, the training data
can be considered “imbalanced.” Imbalanced datasets can lower the classifier’s performance
for the minority class, here substantive labels. We thus use the popular oversampling algorithm
SMOTE to create a dataset with balanced labels. See N. V. Chawla et al., SMOTE: Synthetic
Minority Over-sampling Technique, 16 J. ARTIF. INTELL. RES. 321, 326-31, 352 (2002).
80 The training set consists of 80% of the labeled paragraphs, while the test set consists of 20%
of the labeled paragraphs.
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use the training set to train and compare four popular machine learning
classifiers, the details of which are included in the appendix.81
With the trained classifiers, we predict whether paragraphs contained in the
test set are significant. In a last step, we compare the labels created by the
classifiers to the labels created by the human annotator. We repeat the entire
process five times and compare the performance of the classifiers across
iterations.82 Importantly, because the classifiers have never encountered the
paragraphs in the test set during training, the process yields an unbiased
assessment of the classifiers’ performance.83 Our best-performing classifier
correctly predicts 83% of all texts,84 which we then use to identify all significant
texts in the FR.
To further distinguish between regulatory paragraphs imposing a procedural
or a substantive policy choice, we repeat the above process with a separate
dataset of 699 paragraphs, hand-labeled for the existence of procedural policy
choices. The classifiers trained on this latter set are even more precise, correctly
predicting 93% of all texts. This process leaves us with 651,164 paragraphs, of
which 63,540 (or about 10%) are procedural. More than 90% of our dataset, in
other words, consists of texts regarding substantive policy choices.

Intuitively, each classifier can be viewed as an algorithm that automatically “reads” the text
of a document and assesses how predictive certain words (or patterns of words or phrases) are
for the label applied by the annotator. A naïve Bayes classifier using a multivariate Bernoulli
distribution (“Bernoulli NB”), a naïve Bayes classifier using a multinomial distribution
(“Multinomial NB”), an Adaptive Boosting algorithm (“ADA Boosting”), and a Gradient
Boosting algorithm (“Gradient Boosting”). The details of the individual classifiers are
complex and do not need to be laid out in detail. However, given that we can verify the
performance of the classifiers without probing their mechanics, readers should not be deterred
if the algorithms appear to be a “black box” to them.
82 More precisely, we implement a 5-fold cross validation procedure. This means that we split
the labeled data into five subsets, {𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡1 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡2 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡3 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡4 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡5 }. We then
use four of these subsets to train the classifier and one to test its performance. We repeat the
step five times, each time holding back a different subset. For instance, in iteration 1, we may
use {𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡1 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡2 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡3 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡4 } to train and {𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡5 } to test. Then, in iteration 2,
we use {𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡1 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡2 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡3 , 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡5 } to train and {𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡4 } to test, and so on. The
overall performance of a classifier is the performance averaged across all five iterations. We
employ 5-fold cross validation to minimize the risk that the assessed performance is the
consequence of a particularly unusual split of our data into a training and a test set.
83 Without a test set, machine learning classifiers often overfit. “Overfitting” means that the
classifier’s predictions are influenced by random noise. For instance, if the word “labor”
appears only once in a significant paragraph and never appears in an insignificant paragraph,
the classifier may incorrectly assume that the word “labor” is predictive of significance, when
in fact, the observed pattern was merely the result of chance.
84 We note that this performance is close to the theoretical limit, given that even two humans
reading the same texts often differ on the correct label. This is also called the “Accuracy” or
“Correct Classification Rate.” Other performance metrics popular in the literature on
information sciences are the AUC (0.86) and the 𝐹1 score (0.83). Our best performing
classifier is the Gradient Boosting classifier.
81
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Table 1 below contains more information on the final dataset. The Appendix
further breaks down the amount of regulatory activity by agency. Doing so
reveals significant heterogeneity in activity levels, with the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of the Treasury drafting the most
regulatory paragraphs by a significant margin.85

Table 1. Frequencies in the Federal Register Dataset

Unit

Frequency

Rules

27,714

Sections

108,365

Paragraphs

651,164

Agencies

134

Subagencies

179

2.

Identifying Text Reuse

The next methodological challenge is to measure regulatory paragraph reuse
between different agencies. We must have a way of assessing how alike two texts
are, what is known as a “similarity measure.” Among the measures that exist in
the literature, we choose the “Jaccard similarity,” which is an established
measure that is computationally feasible given our large dataset as well as
amenable to a number of other techniques designed to locate matching pairs
efficiently.86 We begin by splitting each paragraph into sequences of five
consecutive words (or “5-gram shingles”). To illustrate, consider the sentence:
The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog
This sentence can be split into the following five-word sequences:

85

The EPA promulgated 84,284 paragraphs and the Department of Treasury 84,172
paragraphs. After that, the Department of Agriculture promulgated 55,934 paragraphs.
86 See the appendix for more details. Although the Smith-Waterman local alignment algorithm
is particularly popular in the literature on text reuse, see, for example, John Wilkerson, David
Smith & Nicholas Stramp, Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in Legislatures: A Text Reuse
Approach, 59 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 947 (2015); and Linder et al., supra note 48, at 550-51., it is
not conceptually compatible with very large corpora, and thus should not be used in our
context.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the quick brown fox jumps
quick brown fox jumps over
brown fox jumps over the
fox jumps over the lazy
jumps over the lazy dog

Our similarity measure computes how many of these five-word sequences
overlap between two paragraphs and divides that by the number of unique fiveword sequences in these paragraphs. For instance, if eight out of ten sequences
are identical, then their Jaccard similarity is 0.8. In effect, our approach assigns
two paragraphs a high similarity score if they use the same words in the same
word order. In contrast, the similarity score is lower if the consecutive number
of similar words is smaller.87
Having scored pairs of regulatory paragraphs in this way, we must now ask
what level of similarity between the paragraphs should count as an instance of
diffusion. On one end of the spectrum is a similarity score of 1 representing exact
copying-and-pasting between two agencies. At this level, the two paragraphs
between agencies are indistinguishable. Following the lead of one of our
interview subjects, it might be useful to refer to this approach as indicating that
an agency used a previous rule as an exact “template.” In these cases, a rule
drafter took a preexisting rule and simply copied it verbatim into a new
rulemaking.88
Below this threshold, however, are a number of instances where it is almost
certain that the drafter used a previous rule, if not as a template, then certainly as
a “model.”89 While the paragraph may not be an exact copy, it is sufficiently
similar as to reflect one agency’s clear use of another agency’s rule as the basis
of its own. There may be very slight word variations, but the relationship
between the two pairs is virtually unmistakable. There is still a substantial
amount of text reuse and thus “copying” in a broader sense. Because our
normative concerns are matters of degree, that is, they become stronger the more
text diffuses, we aim to include pairs that reflect agency behavior looking to
previous rules as both models and templates.
Upon manual inspection of paragraphs across the range of similarity scores,
we determine that a similarity score of 0.5 and greater makes it almost impossible
to assume that the agency did not model its paragraph after an existing text. In
contrast, for similarity scores below 0.5, although some portions of text may
overlap, it is increasingly difficult to assume that one paragraph served as a
87

Because computing the Jaccard similarity explicitly for every pair of two paragraphs would
require making 212 billion comparisons and because this is computationally infeasible, we
further employ techniques from big data analysis to only compute the Jaccard similarity for
those pairs of contracts that are likely similar. Details on this process are included in the
appendix.
88 Interview with Daniel Cohen, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation, U.S. Department
of Transportation (Feb. 3, 2021) (notes on file with author).
89 Id.
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model for the other. Consequently, we define as our threshold for text reuse a
similarity score of 0.5. To illustrate the textual difference at this threshold,
consider the below example in which we underline all discrepancies between the
paragraphs:
Sample Paragraph 1: The disclosure must contribute to the understanding
of a reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject, as opposed
to the individual understanding of the requester. A requester’s expertise in the
subject area as well as his or her ability and intention to effectively convey
information to the public will be considered. It will ordinarily be presumed that
a representative of the news media satisfies this consideration.90
Sample Paragraph 2: The disclosure must contribute to the understanding
of a reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject, as opposed
to the individual understanding of the requester. A requester's expertise in the
subject area as well as the requester’s ability and intention to effectively convey
information to the public must be considered. TVA will presume that a
representative of the news media will satisfy this consideration.91
It is fairly clear that the agency drafting Sample Paragraph 2 looked to
Sample Paragraph 1 as a model. There is a substantial amount of copied text
along with only minor and non-substantive word discrepancies.
Although some may be skeptical about the subjectivity of our decision, the
choice of the exact threshold has little consequence in practice. Consider Figure
1 below, which plots the distribution of similarity scores across all pairs that we
analyze.92 Observe that the plurality of paragraph pairs in our dataset have a
similarity of exactly 1.93 In addition, there are no remarkable features of the
distribution around our threshold of 0.5. Hence, whether we set the specific
threshold a bit above or below 0.5 should not significantly affect our results. That
said, we have also tested the robustness of our main findings to alternative
thresholds.94

90

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/xml/2014/02/19/2014-03549.xml
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/xml/2017/10/05/2017-21204.xml
92 We plot the range of similarity scores from 0.45 to 1. To understand why, recall that we
employ a probabilistic process that captures pairs with a similarity of 0.5 with a probability of
1, but pairs with a smaller similarity at lower probability. Hence, it would be misleading to
plot the entire range of similarity scores from 0 to 1, because low frequencies at small
similarity scores could simply be the result of our probabilistic procedure and not the fact that
they are indeed uncommon. At 0.45, the probability for a pair to make it into our dataset is
0.98.
93 More precisely, 46% of pairs have a similarity of 1.
94 The general patterns we detail in Figure 3 and surrounding text are substantively similar for
all thresholds between 0.5 and 1.
91
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Figure 1.

Distribution of Similarity Scores

Finally, a few other features of our dataset also require brief consideration
to isolate our phenomenon of interest. First, we assume that each paragraph can
be borrowed only once per agency pair. If an agency borrows from another
agency twice, we assume that the second time is a case of reusing its own
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language rather than that of another.95 Next, as previously mentioned, agencies
can issue “joint” or “common” regulations resulting in a single rule signed by
the relevant agencies. The nature of these rulemakings makes it unclear how
much text reuse there is between agencies as opposed to consensus drafting or
top-down direction by a coordinating official. Relatedly, because the rule results
in a single, unified text, it is difficult to ascertain which agencies are leaders or
followers. For these reasons, if the pair of paragraphs includes at least one text
published by a number of agencies at the same time, we include one observation
for each agency that participated in the rulemaking process.96
Regulatory diffusion also occurs between bureaus and offices within
agencies over time. For instance, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
could reuse regulatory text from the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA)—both are sub-agencies within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). While this dynamic is interesting, it is arguably much easier to explain
than inter-agency diffusion, which is the topic of focus: Many agencies, for
example, have central, coordinating offices that can diffuse regulatory text across
sub-agencies or otherwise keep templates on file.97 In addition, our dataset is
missing the subagency identity for many entries. For these reasons, we exclude
all instances of diffusion that occur within the same agency, focusing instead on
inter-agency diffusion.98
95

For instance, it might happen that agency 𝐴2 publishes regulatory language in the FR that
resembles that of 𝐴1 twice, once in 2010 and again in 2015. In this case, we would only include
the pair {𝐴1 , 𝐴2 }2010 , not {𝐴1 , 𝐴2 }.2015 Again, our rationale is that once 𝐴2 has reused the
regulatory text of 𝐴1 in 2010, it is sensible to assume that any future reuse is 𝐴2 borrowing
from what is now its own regulatory language, rather than using the regulation of 𝐴1 as a
model for a second time.
For instance, if an agency 𝐴1 borrows text from a joint rule enacted by agencies 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 and
𝐴4 collectively, then our dataset includes three observations: {𝐴1 , 𝐴2 }, {𝐴1 , 𝐴3 } and {𝐴1 , 𝐴4 }.
At the same time, we do not count pairs of text reuse that occur between two agencies that
both were part of the same joint rulemaking process. For instance, in our example above, we
do not include {𝐴2 , 𝐴3 }, {𝐴2 , 𝐴4 } and {𝐴3 , 𝐴4 } into our dataset. From an empirical perspective,
we note that pairs in which both agencies are part of the same rule outnumber pairs where
each agency is part of a different rule by a factor of 8.96 Thus, if we were to add these pairs to
our dataset, our analysis would also largely reduce to a study of joint and common
rulemakings, which are not the only dynamics we are interested in. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 37, at 1166-73.
97 See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 29 HARV. L. REV. 421, 453–59 (2015).
98 Some instances of text reuse between agencies occurs because Congress has created a new
agency that assumes the functions of pre-existing agencies. DHS, for example, incorporated
many of the tasks of the U.S. Coast Guard (previously within the Department of
Transportation), U.S. Customs and the U.S. Secret Service (both within the Department of
Treasury), and Immigration and Naturalization Service (within Department of Justice), among
others. When DHS started operations in 2013, it simply republished many of the rules of these
predecessor agencies. We exclude these instances for reasons similar to excluding intraagency diffusion: They can, in some sense, be viewed as instances of agencies copying from
themselves. When republication occurs, the new agency’s subunits are copying texts from
previous subunits that had been housed in a different agency. For this reason, we exclude
96
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After omitting the above categories, we end up with 36,146 observations,
where each observation is a pair of two texts that have been published in the FR
by different agencies. These observations form our core dataset.
B.

Analysis

To generate systematic insights into patterns of text reuse, it is helpful to
conceive of drafting agencies as a network. In that network, agencies can be
thought of as nodes, or verticies, and instances of text reuse can be thought of as
edges, or links, that connect these nodes.99 These links represent relationships
between agencies that arise because of their shared regulatory paragraphs.100 On
the one hand, this lens allows for observations about the structure of connections
between agencies. These sustained interactions suggest synergies between
agencies that may otherwise be unexpected. On the other hand, it also allows for
more in-depth analyses between clusters of agencies or between those at the
center and the periphery. 101 To help visualize this, Figure 2 below plots two such
networks. The left panel depicts text reuse between all agencies in the year 2005.
The right panel depicts text reuse in the year 2020.
Figure 2: Network Plots of Regulatory Diffusion, 2005 and 2020

2005

2020

First observe that the diffusion network in the right panel contains many
more edges than the network on the left. Specifically, the number of edges
increased from 145 to 734. Second, there are many more agencies that are
connected to other agencies by at least one edge. Together, these findings suggest
that the prevalence of text reuse, as well as the number of agencies and agency-

republished paragraphs from the dataset by dropping those rules with summaries indicating
that the rule has been republished. Of course, if an agency has not specified that the rule has
been republished (even though it has), we are unable to drop it.
99 See Ryan Whalen, Legal Networks: The Promises and Challenges of Legal Network
Analysis, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 539, 540-42 (2016).
100 A useful analogy may be the network analysis of judicial citation practices to understand
what sources judges were drawing from when making decisions. Id. at 548-51.
101 Id. at 543.
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relationships affected by text reuse, has increased markedly over the past fifteen
years.
While network plots help in uncovering these overall, systematic trends,
they also raise many additional questions: How significant is the phenomenon of
text reuse to the entire system of rulemaking? How did patterns change year-toyear in our dataset? And who are the most influential agencies in the network?
In the following Subpart, we attempt to shed light on these and other questions.
1.

Scope

To examine how significant the phenomenon of regulatory text reuse is and
how its significance has changed over time, we begin by considering how much
of the language in the CFR is original to the agency and how much of it is simply
a version of pre-existing regulatory text. We thus compute the number of
paragraphs in the CFR that have been reused as a fraction of all paragraphs
appearing in the CFR over time.102
Figure 3: Reused text as a fraction of all paragraphs, 2000 to 2020

Figure 3 plots the yearly number of shared paragraphs over time. A blue
dashed regression line indicates linear time trends, with the grey-shaded area
surrounding it representing 95% confidence intervals of the linear trend. Note
that the share of reused paragraphs increases over time, from less than 3% in the
year 2000 to more 10% by 2020: a relative increase of more than 300%. Put
differently, as of 2020, one out of every ten new paragraphs in the CFR has been
borrowed from pre-existing text.
102

Technically, only paragraphs that appear in full text in the FR are included in our analysis.
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As Figure 3 suggests, the rate of text reuse was particularly high in 2017—
the first year of the Trump Administration. Manual inspection reveals that this
spike reflects a particularly high count of reused paragraphs103 combined with a
decrease in overall regulatory activity.104 In other words, the rate was higher in
that year because agencies were both borrowing more texts while promulgating
a smaller number of new regulatory paragraphs. This finding is consistent with
two documented observations about the start of the Trump Administration: first,
the slow-down in regulatory activity and, second, the short staffing in agencies.105
The slowdown likely explains the decrease in new regulatory paragraphs, while
the decrease in administrative capacity may have precipitated more borrowing
from pre-existing rules.
The general upwards trend in Figure 3, in turn, may reflect a number of
different explanations, which are difficult to disentangle. First, it could reflect
the choices of the Trump Administration, as just discussed. The magnitude of
the increases in borrowing rates during those years could increase the average
rates over time. Alternatively, the trend could also reflect a genuine overall
change in agency behavior over time, that is, a decision to borrow regulatory
texts at a higher rate. With the historical decrease in agency budgets,106 agencies
may increasingly turn to the strategy of text reuse as a way to maintain regulatory
activity.
Another set of potential explanations arises from the necessarily increasing
stock of regulatory paragraphs over time. As the years pass, the amount of
regulatory language in the CFR necessarily increases. Thus, the trend could
merely be a function of the increasing stock of text available for agencies to

103

The absolute number of copied significant paragraphs increased from 2,800 in 2016 to
4,000 in 2017.
104 The absolute number of new significant paragraphs decreased from almost 47,000 in 2016
to 20,000 in 2017.
105 See Patrick A. McLaughlin, Regulatory Data—Trump’s First Year, available at
https://www.quantgov.org/trumpfirstyear (“During President Trump’s first year, federal
regulations grew by about 0.65 percent, less than the growth rate of any other president’s
first year in office since our data begin in 1970. This rate of growth is also less than onethird of the long-term annual growth rate for federal regulations, which, from 1970 to 2016,
was about 2.1 percent.”); see also Lisa Rein, How Trump’s first year has decimated federal
bureaucracy, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 30, 2017)
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/president-donald-trump-white-housefirst-year-inauguration-federal-bureaucracy-barack-obama-a8135921.html (“By the end of
September, all Cabinet agencies except Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs and Interior
had fewer permanent staff than when Trump took office in January – with most shedding
many hundreds of employees.”).
106 See Jonathan Remy Nash, J.B. Ruhl, and James Salzman, The Production Function of the
Regulatory State: How Much Do Agency Budgets Matter? 102 MINN L. REV. 695, 697 (2017)
(providing data that suggest that “budget-cutting initiatives, whether aimed at specific
agencies or the regulatory state in general, have gone far beyond rhetoric to impose real
impacts on agency resources”).

26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

borrow. Moreover, because our dataset begins in 2000, this limitation can also
mechanically create the perception of an increase.107
To address these concerns, we now assess reuse patterns while omitting any
pair in which more than five years lie between the publication dates of the two
paragraphs. The idea behind this approach is that it discounts reuse if the text
that is borrowed from is “old” in some sense. Starting in 2005, it thus mitigates
the concern that observed diffusion practices are merely dictated by an evergrowing body of regulatory text to borrow from. The result is depicted as a green,
dotted line in Figure 3. Although the five-year restriction naturally lowers the
amount of text reuse each year, it remains comparatively high, with 8% of all
paragraphs copied by the year 2020.
Under this more conservative measure, the rate of borrowing now appears
steadier over time between 2000 and 2016, with a marked increase shortly before
2017. The observed increase in text reuse, that is, is now driven almost entirely
by an increase in text reuse under the Trump administration. On the one hand,
this five-year constraint suggests that the previously observed trend, at least
before 2017, may have been a function of the increasing stock of regulatory texts,
rather than any changes in agency behavior. On the other hand, the five-year
constraint also dispenses with actual cases of copying by the agency, which may
not be ascribable to the stock alone. As a result, it is unclear which approach best
describes the underlying reality: each presents methodological tradeoffs. What
we can say is that both of these measures do suggest a change in agency behavior,
especially under the Trump Administration, rather than a mechanical result of
the dataset.108
* * *
To add additional context, Figure 4 now examines the number of agencies
over time that participate in text reuse. We denote as “borrowing” agencies those
agencies that reuse regulatory paragraphs and as “lending” agencies those from
whom regulatory paragraphs are reused.109 As Figure 4 below indicates, both the
number of borrowing and the number of lending agencies increases over time.
107

Specifically, if a regulation is borrowed from the pre-2000 CFR for the first time, we treat
it as an instance of original rulemaking. Only when it is borrowed subsequent times do we
capture it as an instance of text borrowing. This means that we undercount instances of text
reuse in early years. However, because we do track text reuse of pre-2000 rules after the first
instance of borrowing, and because agency proclivity to borrow from old rules decreases over
time, the potential bias induced should be most pronounced in early years, and then quickly
decrease.
108 This observation would be consistent with a vein of recent literature on the singularity of
the recent regime. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative
Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 Duke L.J. 1669 (2019) (noting “a pattern” where
Trump administration agency action is “inconsistent with basic administrative law doctrines”);
Jody Freeman & Sharon Jacobs, Structural Deregulation, HARV. L. REV. at 7-8 (forthcoming),
draft available on SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3835246
(noting the Trump administration’s “structural deregulation” strategy to impair agencies).
109 As before, we consider two paragraphs being “reused” if their similarity is at or above our
threshold of 0.5.
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Figure 4: Lending and Borrowing Agencies

28

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

However, the increase in the number of lending agencies is much steeper than
the increase in the number of borrowing agencies. This suggests that the network
of paragraph reuse disperses more over time, with a relatively small number of
agencies borrowing text from an increasingly large group. In other words,
regulatory paragraphs diffuse from more agencies over time. The trend persists
if we constrain instances of text reuse to a five-year window, although as before,
much of the observed increase is recent.
Overall, our analysis suggests that the reuse of regulatory paragraphs is a
phenomenon that has potentially increased in significance. Not only has the share
of all reused text increased over time— recall that a more conservative analysis
suggests that most of the increase is concentrated in recent years—but so have
the number of agencies that participate in the practice.
2.

Leaders and Followers

These aggregate observations, however, do not tell us much about
relationships between particular agencies or the extent to which those agencies
dominate the trends, whether as leaders or followers. A natural follow-up
question therefore is which specific agencies are influencing the regulatory
process through their outsized roles. To gain insights, we compute “leadership”
and “follower” scores for each agency. To motive our analysis, note that agencies
can either lend or borrow regulatory language. An agency that frequently lends
its regulatory language to other agencies likely has a significant influence on
regulatory drafting. An agency that primarily borrows regulatory language
without lending it is likely to have little relevance beyond the confines of its own
jurisdiction.
There are at least two different ways in which an agency could be considered
a “leader” in regulatory drafting: The first focuses on the agency’s overall
influence on the Code of Federal Regulations, while the second looks at the
number of other agencies that copy from it. In other words, an agency could be
considered a leader for (1) its depth of influence on published regulatory text as
a whole or (2) for its breadth of influence on a number of different agencies.
These two measures highlight different aspects of drafting leadership.
Along the first dimension regarding depth of influence, we use a weighted
count of the number of times an agency’s original regulatory paragraphs have
appeared in the CFR. The weights are necessary to account for situations where
an agency’s text has been reused by multiple agencies over time. In these
situations, the leadership attribution must be split among agencies that previously
reused the text since a borrowing agency could have looked to any of these
agencies for leadership. The Appendix explains this approach in more depth.
Using this measure, Table 2 below ranks the top five agency leaders in terms of
their absolute impact on the CFR. Again, the leadership score in the righthand
column reflects the weighted number of drafted paragraphs that have been copied
by others.
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Table 2: Top Five Agencies by Leadership Score
Agency
Department of the Treasury

Weighted
Leadership Score
1332

Office of Management & Budget

842

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

763

Department of Homeland Security

733

Department of Transportation

715

One might argue here that these results should be normalized in some sense
by the agency’s drafting activity level. The idea would be that a leadership score
could potentially be indicative of the quality of the regulations written by an
agency; thus, that score should be adjusted by the number of regulations
drafted.110 Such a normalized measure, however, is likely to be misleading for a
number of reasons. First, highly specialized agencies are more likely to regulate
in narrow issue areas, thus producing text that may not be reused by other
agencies for lack of relevance. So a lower fraction of copied paragraphs may
reflect congressional choices about an agency’s jurisdiction rather than the
agency’s drafting prowess.
In addition, agencies that engage in very little rulemaking may score
artificially high when they draft regulations under cross-cutting statutes like the
Freedom of Information Act. Because their denominators are already low,
agencies with even a few copied paragraphs (which they may not have even
originated) could have scores that inflate their perceived influence. For all these
reasons, we continue our analysis with a score that is unadjusted for the amount
of drafting activity. That said, for the sake of completeness, we provide a table
listing adjusted leadership scores in the Appendix.111 As expected, the results are

110

The argument would be that some agencies have their regulations copied more only
because they promulgate more regulations in the first place. As a result, it is important to
adjust the number of regulatory paragraphs copied by the number promulgated. Perhaps doing
so would result in some measure of drafting quality, a sense of what fraction of an agency’s
drafted rules are copied. The higher this fraction, the better the agency’s drafting prowess, as
evidenced by emulation by others.
111 Table A.3. More broadly, there is a correlation of 0.58 between an agency’s rank based on
our leadership scores and that agency’s rank as measured by regulatory activity.
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largely driven by the aforementioned exogenous factors and are therefore
difficult to interpret.112
Returning then to our absolute measure of CFR influence, Table 2 shows
that the Department of Treasury has the most copied paragraphs, followed by the
Office of Management and Budget. Perhaps not coincidentally, both of these
agencies have leadership roles when it comes to the rulemaking process. The
Treasury Secretary chairs the Financial Stability and Oversight Council (FSOC),
which Congress established in 2010 to address sources of systemic financial
risk.113 More broadly, the Council’s mandate is to identify potential bank failures,
respond to emerging financial threats, and coordinate among the member
agencies.114 The group consists of several prominent banking-related agencies
under Treasury’s leadership.115 As the chair, the Treasury Secretary calls
meetings, testifies to Congress on behalf of FSOC, and can effectively veto the
systemic designation of various firms.116 It would thus be natural for member
agencies to perceive Treasury as a leader in other rulemaking realms as well.
Indeed, we find that FSOC agencies are the main driver of Treasury's
leadership score: 65% of its leadership score are the consequence of borrowing
by FSOC agencies. More revealingly, 86% of that borrowing occurred after the
FSOC's creation in 2010. By contrast, for non-FSOC agencies, the majority of
copying (53%) occurred prior to the creation of the FSOC. In other words, only
FSOC agencies increased the frequency with which they copied from the
Department of Treasury after 2010--and drastically so. Together, these findings
lend support to the suggestion that it was the creation of the FSOC in 2010, and
Treasury's leadership role within it, that significantly increased the department's
influence.

112

The agencies with the highest leadership scores are simply the agencies with very little
regulatory activity. For instance, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has the highest
relative score, but only promulgated 89 regulatory paragraphs during our period of
observation. In contrast, the EPA as the most active agency promulgated 84,284 paragraphs,
but receives the third lowest relative leadership score among all agencies.
113 See JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45052, FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (FSOC): STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES (2018).
114 See Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative
Process, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 693-94 (2013); Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34
YALE J. REG. 545, 576-79 (2017).
115 They include the Federal Reserve; Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection; Securities
and Exchange Commission; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Commodity Futures
Trading Commission; Federal Housing Finance Agency, and National Credit Union
Administration. See About FSOC, Financial Stability Oversight Council
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscalservice/fsoc/about-fsoc (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
116 STUPAK, supra note 113, at 3.
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Moreover, Treasury also has a long history and culture of quasiindependence, which likely contributes to a flair of drafting originality.117 Over
the years, the agency “has created for itself an ambit of discretion beyond the
reach of the judiciary, and only somewhat within the bounds of congressional
oversight.”118 For example, it often issues rules without notices of proposed
rulemaking, especially on tax-related matters.119 Truncating administrative
procedure in this way inevitably allows for more drafting discretion.120
Generally speaking, Treasury also has a more cooperative rather than
litigious and antagonistic relationship with its regulated entities. 121 As a result, it
may develop rules, particularly procedural rules, which benefit from close input
from those required to comply with them. This cooperative dynamic could result
in more detailed rules worthy of emulation. Indeed, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) is the unit within Treasury that has the most copied
regulations. The OCC supervises federally-chartered banks and thrifts,
deploying examiners to regulated banks to closely monitor them.122
Consequently, OCC may write regulations with a more nuanced appreciation of
its regulated entities.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in turn, contains the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is charged by executive
order with reviewing significant rules from executive agencies.123 During this
process, OIRA evaluates the rule’s adherence to presidential policies and costbenefit principles, and can effectively reverse the rules on these grounds.124
OMB’s influence is reinforced by its Resource Management Offices (RMOs),

117

See David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 187, 190 (2010)
(“Treasury has marched to the beat of its own drum since the founding of the current
administrative state in the aftermath of World War II.”).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 200, 202.
120 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and MetaStandards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 812–13 (2002) (describing Administrative Procedure Act
as a statute[] designed to constrain agency discretion”).
121 Id. at 207-10 (“As a regulator, Treasury embodies a cooperative approach, where its leaders
speak on the phone with the institutions they oversee more than do senior officials at other
agencies, perhaps more than any other agency in the government”).
122 Id. at 207-208.
123 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(1) (“OIRA may review only actions identified by the
agency or by OIRA as significant regulatory actions under subsection (a)(3)(A) of this
section”).
124 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1769 (2013) (discussing difference between “political review (those issues raised as part
of the President’s agenda and priorities) and analytical review (how agencies evaluate the
costs and benefits of regulatory options, justify the choices among them, and consider a host
of other technical issues”); id. at 1778 (describing how “OIRA can effectively reverse an
agency action on behalf of the President and”).
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which implements policy choices through various budgetary levers.125 RMOs can
also sometimes play a role in OIRA regulatory review itself. 126 As a result,
OMB’s institutional impact on the rulemaking process is pervasive. The drafting
choices of OMB’s components may thus have particular weight with other
agencies. For example, OMB contains the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP), which is responsible for coordinating and “provid[ing] overall
direction” for regulations related to government acquisition.127 It often uses this
role to promulgate “model rules,”128 which are then emulated by other
agencies.129
An alternative way to conceptualize leadership within a network is by
looking at the number of agencies that have copied from another agency. These
nodes have the most edges connected to other agencies. Instead of focusing on
an agency’s influence on published regulations as a whole, in other words, this
measure looks instead at how many other agencies have used its language. How
many spokes, that is, are in the most active hubs within the network?
Table 3 below presents the top five leader agencies according to this
alternate metric, for agencies with a minimum of five copied paragraphs (those
with fewer paragraphs are likely outliers). The numbers in the righthand column
represent the number of agencies that borrow from the agency listed in the
lefthand column. Unsurprisingly, the Department of Justice has the most
agencies that borrow from it, likely because it coordinates a number of crosscutting statutes applicable to a wide variety of agencies, such as Title IX of the
1972 Education Amendments, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.130 By executive order, the Attorney General
is charged with reviewing “existing and proposed rules” from “Executive
See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
YALE L.J. 2182, 2207 (2016) (describing “aspects of the budget process [that] provide OMB
with seven levers to control agency action”).
126 See Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 120 (2006) (“According to OIRA, the desk
officers always consult with the relevant resource management office on the ‘budget side’ of
OMB as part of their reviews, and reviews of draft rules are not completed until those offices
sign off.”).
127 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/management/office-federal-procurement-policy/ (“The
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in the Office of Management and Budget
plays a central role in shaping the policies and practices federal agencies use to acquire the
goods and services they need to carry out their responsibilities.”).
128 See, e.g., Uniform Rules of Procedure for Boards of Contract Appeals and Related
Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 12519-03 (Mar. 7, 1979).
129 See, e.g., Arthur V. Wittich, Contracting with the Federal Government: The Dispute
Resolution Process, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 128, 141–42 (1984) (noting that OFPPs model rules
of procedure for contract appeals “have since been adopted by most boards, including the
Department of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals”).
130 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681; 29 U.S.C.A. § 794; 42 U.S.C. 6101-6107.
125
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agencies in order to identify those which are inadequate, unclear or unnecessarily
inconsistent.” 131 Beyond merely coordinating agency action under these statutes,
the Attorney General holds veto power over them, which can be used to require
consistent regulatory texts across agencies.

Table 3: Top Five Leader Agencies, by Number of Borrowing Agencies
(with minimum of 5 paragraphs borrowed)
Agency
Department of Justice
National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Environmental Protection Agency

Number of
Borrowing Agencies
58
56
50
46
43

Turning to the next agency on the list, the reasons for the National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities influence are not obvious at first glance.
A qualitative examination, however, reveals that most of the borrowing from
other agencies appears to arise from regulations issued by one of its
subcomponents: the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS). The
primary mission of IMLS is to award grants and develop policy with regard to
American museum, libraries and similar organizations.132 In 2010, Congress
granted the Director new responsibilities to coordinate “museum, library, and
information services” with other broader information dissemination efforts
across government.133 This leadership role may help to explain why many
borrowed regulations deal with the Freedom of Information Act and similar
information-related policies.

* * *
Turning now from leader to follower agencies, we also compute a
“follower score,” measured by the number of unique paragraphs borrowed by
that agency. Table 4 presents the results of that analysis, ranking the top five
agencies in terms of the number of paragraphs copied from others. While we
131

Leadership and Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws, Exec. Order 12250, 45 FR 72995
(November 2, 1980) (emphasis added).
132 https://www.imls.gov/about/mission (describing “mission” to “advance, support, and
empower America’s museums, libraries, and related organizations through grantmaking,
research, and policy development”).
133 20 U.S.C. 9103
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explore various theories for regulatory diffusion below,134 we explore some
possible explanations here in the context of specific agencies. One striking
feature of the agency with the highest follower score — the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) — is its jurisdictional breadth. When DHS was
established in 2002, it combined 22 different federal departments and agencies
into one Cabinet-level agency.135 As such, it “gained regulatory authority over
transportation security and matters as disparate as marine ecosystems and
refugee admissions.”136 Indeed, current DHS sub-components include the
Citizenship and Immigration Services; Coast Guard; Customs and Border
Protection; the Federal Energy Management Agency; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Secret Service;, and the Transportation Security
Administration.137 In this manner, the jurisdiction of DHS is as broad as it is
disparate.
Table 4: Top Five Agencies by Follower Score
Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Agriculture
Department of the Treasury
Department of Defense
Department of Health and Human Services

Follower Scores
1790
1449
1378
1332
1216

Because of its history and wide-ranging mission, DHS has functions that
are adjacent to many agencies, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the
immigration context138 and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on issues
of maritime security.139 Given that DHS was created more recently than many
agencies, DHS likely sought regulatory consistency by reusing paragraphs from
already existing agencies. Indeed, the Coast Guard was originally housed in

134

See Part II.A.
History, Homeland Sec., (June 15, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/history.
136 Dara Kay Cohen et. al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design
of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676 (2006).
137
Operation and Support Components, Homeland Sec., (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components.
138 See, e.g., Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 805, 832 (2015) (describing coordination between DOJ and DHS on asylum
applications).
139 Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 219 (2011) (observing
that “the Coast Guard was transferred from DOT to DHS” and must thus now “coordinate
with the Department of Transportation for the peacetime maintenance of the coast”).
135
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DOT before it was transferred to DHS.140 It would thus be natural for staff at
Coast Guard to look to the work of their former colleagues at DOT. Moreover,
the sprawling nature of the agency, particularly when resources are spread thin,
would also make text reuse more attractive.
A different snapshot of the regulatory drafting network also supports the
theory that policy consistency is a major driver of diffusion, especially within
relatively closed networks. Table 5 below identifies the strongest lenderborrower relationships between individual agencies. To that end, we compute
the weighted frequency of each unique agency pair.141 Most of the pairs reflect a
jurisdictional overlap between the agencies. For example, both Treasury and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation deal with the issue of bank stability and,
as discussed, are members of FSOC.142 As also mentioned, both DHS and DOT
deal with transportation-related matters, with DHS containing subcomponents
like the Coast Guard that were formerly part of DOT.143 Both Treasury and the
Federal Reserve are also members of FSOC.144
Table 5: Top Five Agency Pairs by Weighted Frequency

Lending Agency

Borrowing Agency

Department
of
the
Treasury
Department
of
Transportation
Department
of
the
Treasury
Department of Homeland
Security
Social
Security
Administration

Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Department of Homeland
Security
Federal Reserve System

Frequency
(weighted)
450
412
336

Department of Transportation

160

Office of Management and
Budget

157

140

Id. (noting that the Coast Guard was transferred from DOT to DHS).
We once again apply weighting scheme to take into account uncertainty about whom an
agency borrowed from. In our analysis, we take into account the direction of the reuse. Hence,
if 𝐴2 borrows text from 𝐴1 , we treat this as different from a text reuse where 𝐴1 borrows from
𝐴2 .
142
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-andfiscal-service/fsoc/about-fsoc
143 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
144 https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-andfiscal-service/fsoc/about-fsoc
141
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From a network perspective, we also note that some agencies such as the
Treasury Department and DHS appear in both lists as top leader and follower
agencies. From a network perspective, this suggests that both agencies are key
to the overall patterns observed in the network. In addition, both are agencies
that produce a high number of regulatory paragraphs and have broad
jurisdictions.145 While Treasury’s jurisdiction is not as disparate as that of DHS,
the agency does deal with a number of discrete issues such as government
finances; taxation; currency; the supervision of national banks and thrift
institutions; terrorist financing; as well as international trade policy.146 As a
result, individual offices and bureaus may be drafting leaders, while others are
followers based on their respective histories and jurisdictions. In other words,
the relative autonomy and activity of these subcomponents may explain the
status of both parent agencies as top leaders and followers.

*

*

*

Finally, one notable feature about the top leader and follower tables above
is the relative dearth of independent agencies.147 Indeed, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve are the only independent agencies
that appear in them.148 Does this imply that executive agencies are more
influential as drafters or more prominent as followers considering their share of
rulemaking activity? To examine this question, we now analyze whether the text
an agency uses to draft its regulation is more likely to originate from an
independent or executive agency, depending on whether the borrowing agency
is independent or executive.

145

See Table A.1 below.
U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Role of the Treasury, https://home.treasury.gov/about/generalinformation/role-of-the-treasury.
147 What falls into the category of “independent agencies” is contested. Some distinguish
between “executive” and “independent” agencies according to whether their heads are
removable for cause. However, many have shown that other criteria such as multi-member
boards or fixed terms better track notions of agency independece. See Kirti Datla & Richard
L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies),
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772 (2013) (calling “incorrect” the assumption that “agencies can
be divided into two identifiable, distinct sets: independent and executive”). That said, for our
purposes, the statutory definition of “independent regulatory agency” is a serviceable way to
draw the line for our purposes. See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012)
(defining “independent regulatory agency”).
148 Id. (designating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as an “independent regulatory
agency”).
146
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Table 6: Percentage of Borrowed Text by Executive or Independent Agency

Executive Agency
Borrower
Independent Agency
Borrower

Executive
Lender
90%

Agency

72%

Independent
Lender
10%

Agency

28%

Table 6 above presents the rates at which executive and independent
agencies borrow paragraphs from their counterparts. Initially, one might
conclude that both executive and independent agencies borrow more from
executive agencies as a group. But this is not necessarily the case. After all, only
10% of all regulatory paragraphs are promulgated by independent agencies.149
The rate at which executive agencies borrow from independent ones corresponds
to the share of regulatory paragraphs promulgated by independent agencies.
Hence, there is no evidence to suggest a systematic bias by executive agencies
in favor of or against independent agencies.
By contrast, independent agencies borrow regulatory text from other
independent agencies at twice the expected rate. One explanation is that
independent agencies “trust” texts from their counterparts, who are generally
more expert and less subject to political change than executive agencies.150 After
all, independent agencies (as their name suggests) are more sheltered from the
whims of changing presidential administrations.151 By contrast, Presidents wield
more control over executive agencies to carry out their agendas,152 which may
render regulations issued by independent agencies less appealing as templates.

II. Explaining Diffusion
Against this empirical backdrop, this Part more systematically considers the
incentives agencies have to reuse regulatory texts when drafting their own. The

149

Of all substantive paragraphs in our FR dataset, 76,477 have been promulgated by IRAs
and 574,687 have been promulgated by EAs.
150 See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1778 (2012) (“Thus, independent agencies--which burgeoned
during the New Deal--were designed with the purpose of shielding expert decisionmakers
from the shifting winds of politics.”).
151 Id.
152 See Nina Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency
Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2459 (2011) (detailing expansion of presidential
control over executive agencies).
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first section examines factors informing this choice, while the second section
considers the mechanisms through which texts diffuse.
A.

Why Diffusion

Command-and-control. One straightforward explanation for text reuse
between administrative agencies is direction from a political principal, whether
Congress or the President. Sometimes, Congress will require agencies to issue
regulations that mimic those of another. The Securities and Exchange Act, for
example, calls for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to issue
regulations that are “substantially similar” to those of the SEC in specific
arenas.153 As a matter of practice, “all of these agencies have copied the SEC’s
regulations, and when the SEC amends its regulations, the banking regulators
usually follow.” 154
At other times, Congress exercises a lighter touch. Instead of requiring that
regulations diffuse, it might command agencies to “share[] regulatory space”155
by designing overlapping functions, granting related jurisdictional tasks, and
explicitly requiring concurrence among agencies.156 Congress can also enact
cross-cutting statutes like the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act that
apply across many agencies.157 In these kinds of situations, agencies are not
required to copy each other’s texts, but may have greater incentives to do so to
ensure consistency between their programs. To get a rough sense of this
dynamic, it is worth noting that roughly two-thirds of the observations in our
dataset share some statutory authority. This may suggest that a good portion of
regulatory diffusion occurs because of choices that Congress has made, though
some of the decision-making still lies in the drafting agency’s discretion.
The President also issues executive orders requiring coordination between
agencies, often resulting in the same regulations being passed by different
agencies. While coordination is not an explicit command to agencies to copy
each other’s regulations, it can sometimes amount to that due to a desire to
promote consistent policy. One order from President Carter, for example, called
for his Attorney General to coordinate and, more importantly, approve
regulations regarding non-discrimination policy across various statutes.158 The
15 U.S.C. § 78l(i). An exception exists where the agencies “find that implementation of
substantially similar regulations with respect to insured banks and insured institutions are not
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for protection of investors, and publish such
findings, and the detailed reasons therefor, in the Federal Register.” Id.
154 See Bradley, supra note 9, at 751.
155 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1146.
156
Id. at 1146, 1160.
157 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a); 5
U.S.C. § 552(f).
158 Exec, Order No. 12250, Leadership and Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws, 45 FR
72995 (Nov. 2, 1980), https://www.justice.gov/crt/executive-order-12250.
153
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agencies that issued regulations in response published rules with the same
regulatory texts.159 In this manner, diffusion can occur because of mandates
external to the agency.
Interest Group Pressure. Other external pressures on the agency come in the
form of interest groups. It is already well-known that lobbyists supply model
legislation to state legislators.160 One study, for example, found that “at least
10,000 bills almost entirely copied from model legislation were introduced
nationwide in the past eight years, and more than 2,100 of those bills were signed
into law.”161 For legislators, copying model legislation is a low-cost way to get
credit for introducing and writing bills, while also currying favor with campaign
donors. Interest groups, for their part, can exert influence under-the-radar:
Providing legislative text does not need to be disclosed on campaign finance or
other expense forms. But once introduced, model bills can “go viral” across
states, “executing an agenda to the letter.”162
So it would be unsurprising to find that interest groups supply regulatory
templates to federal agencies as well. After all, regulations can be even more
consequential than statutes—they actually execute the relevant policy choices.
Indeed, interest groups like the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and United for Efficiency draft and post model regulations.163
They likely encourage agency rule drafters to adopt them through the same
informal channels interest groups normally use to influence agencies.164 More
formally, private actors also propose regulatory text to agencies through
rulemaking petitions.165 The National Civil Liberties Alliance, for example, has
petitioned more than a dozen agencies to adopt proposed regulatory text

159

See, e.g., EPA Nondiscrimination, 52 FR 30598; Group 1 Nondiscrimination, 51 FR 4566;
Group 2 Non discrimination, 51 FR 22880.
160 Rob O’Dell and Nick Penzenstadler, Copy, Paste, Legislate: You Elected Them to Write
New Laws. They’re Letting Corporations Do it Instead, USA TODAY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/04/03/abortion-gun-lawsstand-your-ground-model-bills-conservatives-liberal-corporate-influencelobbyists/3162173002/.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Model Laws, NAIC , https://www.naic.org/prod_serv_model_laws.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2021); Model Regulation Guidelines, UNITED FOR EFFICIENCY,
https://united4efficiency.org/resources/model-regulation-guidelines/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2021).
164 See Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule Making:
A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 353, 362-63 (2005) (describing
various methods of interest group participation before the formal notice-and-comment period).
165 5 U.S.C. 553(e). See generally Jason A. Scwartz & Richard L. Revesz, Petitions for
Rulemaking, Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States,
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%2520Petitions%2520for%2520Ru
lemaking%2520Report%2520%255B11-5-14%255D.pdf.
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regarding the use of agency guidance documents.166 The organization has
submitted written comments to four different agencies to adopt the same
regulatory texts as well.167
Learning. There are also potential explanations for regulatory diffusion
arising from the agency’s perspective. For starters, agencies learn from other
agencies.168 When rule drafters confront a novel subject area, it would be natural
for them to look at how other agencies have approached similar issues. The need
for agencies to learn would be particularly acute when agencies are newly
created or when they gain new statutory authorities.
Learning, in our context, implies that a policy or drafting decision by another
agency has been perceived to be successful, thus meriting adoption.169
“Successful” rules could include those that have been upheld in court, desirably
interpreted, or fostered compliance. Risk-averse lawyers, for example, prefer
language from other agencies that have survived litigation.170 When success is
more difficult to measure or observe, agencies can also use proxies: For example,
rules may be perceived as successful if they have not been abandoned over
time.171 In this sense, learning results in a kind of standardization.172 As one
166

New Civil Liberties Alliance, Petitions for Rulemaking Filed By NCLA: The New Civil
Liberties Alliance Is Taking Federal Departments and Agencies To Task, NEW C.L. ALL. ,
https://nclalegal.org/petitions/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
167 See, e.g., Letter from Kara Rollins, Litig. Couns., New C.L. All., to Brenna Jenny, U.S.
Dep’t Health & Hum. Serv. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://nclalegal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/2020-14-09-NCLA-Final-Comment-to-HHS-re-HHS-GoodGuidance-Practices.pdf
168 See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Account Me in: Agencies in Quest of Accountability, 19 J.L. &
POL’Y 611, 678 (2011) (“Agencies learn from each other—for example, other agencies
emulated the experience of the first agencies with negotiated rulemaking, and OMB
incorporated it into an executive order, recommending it to all agencies.”).
169 See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 840, 841-42 (2008) (“learning involves a determination of whether a policy adopted
elsewhere has been successful”).
170 Interview with Daniel Cohen, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation, U.S. Department
of Transportation (Feb. 3, 2021) (notes on file with author). Lawyers are often rule drafters,
sometimes writing the first draft and other times providing “critical input.” Thomas O.
McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 61 L. &
CONT. PROBS. 19, 26 (1998). ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL
REPORT
ON
PLAIN
LANGUAGE
DRAFTING
26
(2017),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Plain%20Regulatory%20Drafting_Final
%20Report.pdf (“In some agencies, such as the IRS (which considers their regulations an
exercise in statutory interpretation, rather than novel policy-making), rules are drafted by
lawyers in the first instance. Most OGCs, however, will mainly be responsible for ensuring
compliance with the APA and other relevant legal considerations.”).
171 Shipan & Volden, at 842.
172 Cf. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719 (1997). Kahan
and Klausner identify the “potential ‘learning’” Id. at 719-20.
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rulewriter put it, drafters sensibly want to “take the best pieces of regulations”
from other agencies and “mix and match” provisions accordingly.173
Resource Costs. Text reuse becomes even more attractive when drafters are
operating under time or resource constraints. Say, for example, that there is a
statutory deadline on the horizon. Or an outgoing President demands midnight
rules. Or there is a scheduled speech during which the regulation will be
announced. When deadlines like these loom, drafters would be more tempted to
turn to pre-existing regulatory texts, at least on the margin. Drafting rules from
scratch is costly. It usually requires coordination between multiple team
members—lawyers, economists, program officers.174 Substantive issues require
research; options memos must be written; analyses must be completed.175 Thus,
the more a drafter is resource-constrained, the more likely she will be to borrow
language from other regulations. One would thus expect an inverse relationship
between an agency’s resources — measured perhaps by budget or staffing
numbers — and rates of regulatory text reuse. Note that this prospect could also
help “deossify” rulemaking — that is, make it easier for agencies to amend rules
by lowering the costs of drafting new ones.176
Regulatory consistency and coordination. Finally, consider the idea that
regulations should be considered not as individual units in isolation, but rather
as elements of a larger regulatory system contained in the CFR. In this view, text
reuse allows new regulatory language to be more easily embedded into a system
of increasingly complex rules. By contrast, when an agency drafts language from
scratch, it risks creating unintended inconsistencies and conflicts with
preexisting policy choices.
Consider, for example, the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires the SEC and
CFTC to “consult and coordinate” with each other in the regulation of credit
swaps “for the purposes of assuring regulatory consistency and
comparability.”177 After the CFTC issued a final rule regarding business conduct
standards for swaps, the SEC reopened its comment period on its own rules.178
173

Interview with Anonymous Agency Official (Feb. 26, 2021) (notes on file with author).
These teams or “work groups” are usually led by a program office and include members
from other subunits that have a stake in the rule. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R.
FURLONG, RULEMAKING 140 (2019) (“Where responsibility for writing rules is delegated to a
single office or individual, it is still rare for the work to be done in truly splendid isolation.”);
Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency Rulemaking,
61 L. & CONT. PROBS 19, 20 (1998) (“The team model is the predominant model for internal
agency decisionmaking in the context of informal rulemaking.”); ACUS Final Report on Plain
Language
Drafting
26
(2017),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Plain%20Regulatory%20Drafting_Final
%20Report.pdf.
175 See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 174
176 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L. J. 1385-1462 (1992).
177 Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1641. 15 U.S.C. 8302(a)(1)
178 SEC’s Final Rule, 81 FR 29960, 29961.
174
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Unlike the SEC’s original proposal, where “commenters were divided as to
whether they preferred the Commission's or the CFTC's proposed approach to
specific issues,” commenters “overwhelmingly urged the Commission to
harmonize its external business conduct rules with those of the CFTC.”179 The
difference now was that industry groups had already “invested significant
resources and infrastructure to develop and implement systems, policies, and
procedures to comply with these final rules.”180 In response to these comments,
the SEC indeed revised its final rules to “conform them to the rules adopted by
the CFTC.”181 In this manner, copying another agency’s regulation helps ensure
regulatory consistency and the possibility that the new rule better fits better into
the regulatory system as a whole.182
B.

Channels of Diffusion

When drafters seek to emulate regulations from other agencies, through what
channels do these texts diffuse? Sometimes, it is as simple as pulling up the
electronic version of the Code of Federal Regulations and running a keyword
search.183 Indeed, one government lawyer reported doing just that: surveying
published regulations on the same subject matter to emulate those she thought
the most appropriate.184 But rule drafters share information through many other
channels as well. Some of these channels are formal and mandated by Congress
or the President. Consider statutorily required consultation requirements;
bilateral agency memoranda of understanding; and presidential tools of
coordination such as policy councils and regulatory review.185
To illustrate, take the Obama Administration’s Second Open Government
National Action Plan.186 As part of this plan, the Administration pledged to
“initiate an interagency process” to draft a potential “core” regulation regarding
the Freedom of Information Act “that is both applicable to all agencies and

179

Id. at 29964.
Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, ISDA, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, SEC (July 22, 2013), at 3.
181 SEC’s Final Rule, 81 FR at 29962.
182 Cf. Spencer Williams, Contracts as Systems, 45 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 219 (2021) (making a
similar argument in the context of contracts).
183 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1156 (“Informal coordination regularly occurs
without any explicit communication between agencies, as where one agency observes what
another agency is doing or anticipates another agency’s decisions and adjusts its decisions
accordingly to avoid tension or friction.”).
184 Interview with Anonymous Agency Official (Feb. 26, 2021) (notes on file with author).
185 These are the formal coordination tools identified in Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37.
186 See THE OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP: SECOND OPEN GOVERNMENT NATIONAL
ACTION
PLAN
FOR
THE
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA
(2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/us_national_action_plan_6p.p
df.
180
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retains flexibility for agency-specific requirements.”187 The Office of
Information Policy (OIP) within the DOJ led a two-year group to fulfill the
National Action Plan’s requirements, after which it issued template FOIA
regulations for other agencies to adopt.188 The template succeeded in getting
some agencies to adopt the same regulatory language, though its records of
success was mixed.189
Congress can also create more indefinite offices to coordinate the
implementation of trans-substantive statutes like FOIA. In 2009, for example,
the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) was established as part
of the National Archives and Records Administration to “advocate for the proper
administration of FOIA.”190 While it issues guidance documents, OGIS also
provides feedback on individual agencies’ proposed FOIA regulations for
“clarity and readability”191 through both direct contact with agencies and
comments on their proposed rules.192As part of this process, OGIS often provides
drafting templates or recommends that agencies use the same language adopted
by another agency. For example, from 2011 to 2013, OGIS submitted comments
187

Id. at 3.
See Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy, Guidance for Agency FOIA
Regulations, updated June 26, 2019, available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/oipguidance/guidance-agency-foia-regulations.
189 OGIS recommended that the DOI follow the template regulations published by the DOJ
and promise to forward misdirected requests to the appropriate subcomponent within the DOI.
See Office of Government Information Services, Public Comment on Proposed Rule for
Department of the Interior Freedom of Information Act Regulations (Sept. 13, 2012) RIN
1093-AA15. (Nov. 12, 2012). The DOI refused to follow the template, instead promising to
only forward requests that were “clearly intended” for a different subcomponent. 84 FR 61820,
61822 (2019). The agency argued that this was the only way it would be able to meet its
statutory obligations under FOIA as the amount of FOIA requests the DOI receives in a year
has exploded recently. Id. OGIS also made two other suggestions using the DOJ’s template
regulations in its comments to the VA’s 2018 proposed rule. See Office of Government
Information Services, Public Comment on Department of Veterans Affairs Proposed Rule
regarding Release of Information from Department of Veterans’ Affairs Records, VA 2018,
at 3–4 (May 31, 2018). The VA agreed with one suggestion and adopted the template
regulation word for word but rejected the second. 84 FR at 121232121232 (2019). The change
agreed to make was to ensure its regulation reflected the requirements of the FOIA statute
whereas the other change was merely discretionary and the VA felt its existing regulation was
“sufficient.” Id.
190 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE FIRST YEAR: BUILDING A BRIDGE
BETWEEN
FOIA
REQUESTERS
&
FEDERAL
AGENCIES
1
(Mar.
2011),
https://www.archives.gov/files/ogis/assets/website-assets/about-ogis/building-bridgesreport.pdf.
191 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 8 (Sep. 2013),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-650.pdf.
192 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN FOIA
REQUESTERS & FEDERAL AGENCIES: 2013 REPORT FOR FY 2012 18–19 (2012)
https://www.archives.gov/files/ogis/assets/reports/ogis-report-march-2013.pdf.
188

44

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

to various agencies recommending that they adopt the same language as the
Central Intelligence Agency’s FOIA regulation concerning certain fee
waivers.193 One agency, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, adopted
language modeled exactly after the CIA’s regulation as cited by OGIS.194 Other
agencies, however, either ignored the suggestion195 or rejected it with an
accompanying explanation.196
Of course, regulatory drafters also interact with each other informally:
through one-off phone calls or emails to former colleagues or respected
individuals in other agencies; periodic meals or coffees; or conversations at

193

See, e.g., Office of Government Information Services, Public Comment on Defense
Logistics Agency, Proposed Rule to Update its Freedom of Information Act Regulation (Dec.
13, 2012); Office of Government Information Services, Public Comment on Propose Rule for
Department of the Interior Freedom of Information Act Regulations (Sept. 13, 2012); Office
of Government Information Services, Public Comment on The Department of Justice’s
Proposed Rule for Freedom of Information Act Regulations; Office of Government
Information Services, Public Comment on the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s
Proposed Rule on Implementation of Freedom of Information Act 3 (May 26, 2011); Office
of Government Information Services, Public Comment on The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Freedom of Information, Privacy Act, and
Government in the Sunshine Act Procedures (July 13, 2013).
194 See 78 FR at 66995–96 (2013). The PCB discussed OGIS’s comments as the “third
commenter.” While PCB does not mention allowing for discretion when waiving fees like the
CIA regulation, the final rule has language that mirrors the CIA rule cited in OGIS’s letter.
See id. at 67000.
195 FSOC did not adopt OGIS’ suggestion with respect to giving discretion with fee and made
no mention of why it chose to not to adopt the change. In fact, nowhere in the preamble does
FSOC even acknowledge that OGIS made any suggestion concerning the granting of fee
waivers. Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, 77 FR 21,628, 21,628 (Apr. 11,
2012)
(codified
at
12
C.F.R.
pt. 1301);
OGIS’s
comment:
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FSOC-2011-0004-0006.
196 The DOJ also rejected this suggestion, but it at least explained why it made that choice.
According to the DOJ, FOIA “establishes a standard for waiver or reduction of fees” and the
DOJ’s regulations “are intended to define the manner in which this standard is to be applied.”
Revision of Department’s Freedom of Information Act Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,099,
18,102 (Apr. 3, 2015). Thus, it felt that OGIS’s suggestion went too far in allowing discretion
in granting fee waivers under FOIA. Similarly, the DOI declined to adopt adding discretion
because “it [was] concerned that it would create unrealistic expectations on the part of
requesters, undercut FOIA's statutory fee requirements, and provide Department employees
with an unacceptably vague standard.” Freedom of Information Act Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg.
76,898, 76,901 (Dec. 31, 2012). Finally, the DLA rejected adopting the CIA’s language as
suggested by OGIS because it found “it unnecessary to duplicate information published by
DoD.” Defense Logistics Agency Freedom of Information Act Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 30,463,
30,465 (May 28, 2014).
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social events.197 Sometimes these interactions become more institutionalized.198
Indeed, for decades, there was a brown bag lunch group consisting of career staff
from across government.199 They would meet regularly to exchange information,
develop contacts, and brainstorm how to approach similar issues.200 The
longevity of the group was a testament to its perceived usefulness and the “shared
institutional memory” of its participants.201 These more informal mechanisms are
more likely to explain how regulatory texts diffuse across agencies with different
statutory authorities or who otherwise have very little formal interaction because
they do not share regulatory jurisdiction as commonly understood.202
Another potential mechanism of agency cross-pollination is that of staff
migration, whether at the career or political level. A number of the government
officials we interviewed had helped write rules while employed at different
agencies.203 While systematic data on the movement of federal employees
between agencies are sparse, the Office of Personnel Management has a
dedicated transfer process for those serving in the competitive service, which
suggests that it’s at least common enough to have a dedicated procedure for it.204
This transfer process allows civil servants to work in another agency without
undergoing another civil service examination.205 In addition, there are also
executive branch employees that are temporarily assigned (“detailed”) to other
agencies.206 They, too, bring with them knowledge and experience from their
home agencies in their new roles.
To illustrate many of the themes above, consider one government lawyer
who had recently begun work at a new agency. 207 Under pressure from a 60-day
appropriations-related deadline, he reported modeling a new rule he was drafting
after language from one of his previous agency’s regulations. The rule dealt with
197

See Spencer Overton, Political Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1794 (2013)
(“Receptions, lunches, and other informal gatherings give people an opportunity to build
relationships and speak more intimately about substantive issues.”).
198 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1211, 1211 n.106 (“Over time, certain interagency
practices may become institutionalized while still remaining informal.”).
199 Id. at n.106.
200 Id..
201 Id. Id.
202 Cf. id.
203 Interview with Daniel Cohen, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation, U.S. Department
of Transportation (Feb. 3, 2021) (notes on file with author).
204 Office of Personnel Management, Hiring Information, Policy, Data, Oversight Updated
Oct. 2011, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-information/transfer-betweenfederal-agencies/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
205 Id.
206 https://extapps2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Detailees
207 Interview with Daniel Cohen, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation, U.S. Department
of Transportation (Feb. 3, 2021) (notes on file with author).
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various paperwork and procedural requirements.208 He felt the text represented
the “wisdom” of previous learning by the previous, more experienced, agency.209
In this manner, this lawyer brought his experience from his previous agency to
bear on his work at a new agency—a dynamic heightened by a time constraint.
In this manner, regulatory text had diffused across agencies through staff
migration.
III. Implications
This Part now considers some of the implications of text reuse for
administrative process, judicial interpretation, and regulatory drafting. The first
Subpart considers the potential benefits and risks of diffusion. In particular, it
argues that agencies should have a duty to explain why they have borrowed
regulatory texts to allow for executive branch oversight. The second Subpart then
considers the implications of diffusion for regulatory interpretation. In particular,
it argues that the maxim to read similar regulations similarly—the in pari
materia canon—is appropriate in the context of legislative rules.
A.

Evaluating Diffusion

Regulatory drafters can reuse texts for praiseworthy or pernicious reasons.
Perhaps the most obvious benefit of the practice is to promote consistency across
agencies. Textual consistency can reduce compliance costs. The more that rules
are standardized, the less regulated entities must spend on lawyers to interpret
new terms or otherwise comply with novel requirements.210 Consistent policies
across agencies, in turn, can also increase business certainty, especially if the
resulting guidance is consistent as well. These benefits are especially important
to firms that engage in activities implicating the jurisdiction of multiple agencies.
Consider, for example, a requirement in the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act for “vendors of personal health records” to notify their
customers of any breach of sensitive health information.211 The statute called for
HHS to regulate those entities covered by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) whereas the Federal Trade Commission would
cover all other entities.212 Various commenters demanded harmonization
208

Id.
Id.
210 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 47 (2000) (The presence of “one out of one
hundred who adopts a nonstandard form for property rights can increase the costs of
processing the rights of ninety-nine others.”).
211 42 U.S.C. § 17937.
212 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), Pub. L. No. 111–5,
123 Stat. 115. See Recovery Act, 123 Stat. at 260–63 for HHS and 123 Stat. at 269–71 for the
FTC.
209
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between the rules in order to “create a level-playing field for HIPAA and nonHIPAA covered entities.”213 Another group noted that having different standards
would “only increase administrative complexity and cost.”214 Finally, one
organization said that it “may have business components subject to [both the
FTC’s and HHS’] rules” so harmonization between the rules would “greatly
facilitate prompt notice to consumers in the event of any breach of their personal
health information.”215 Heeding these concerns, both agencies decided to consult
with each other “to ensure both sets of regulations were harmonized by including
the same or similar requirements, within the constraints of the statutory
language.”216
Moreover, in line with the learning theory above, agencies also borrow texts
from more knowledgeable agencies that have more experience in a particular
subject area or a greater enforcement role. Take the earlier example involving
Title IX regulations prohibiting sex-based discrimination.217 Recall that twentyone agencies copied most of the Department of Education’s regulations on the
subject. In doing so, they citied the Department’s “history of public participation
in the development and congressional approval” of the regulations as well as the
agency’s “leadership role” in enforcing them.218 In this manner, regulatory
diffusion could foster the dissemination across agencies of expertise and
experience administering a statute.
Borrowing language from other agencies also reduces rulemaking costs—
the time and effort otherwise spent on drafting texts from scratch. As a result,
the practice can help to “deossify” the regulatory process, that is, render it less
resource-intensive.219 Rulemaking can thus be more efficient, facilitating more
updating of existing rules or other necessary changes. The resources saved, in
213

Health Breach Notification Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42963. See also American Benefits
Council, Comment Letter on Health Breach Notification Rule at 2 (June 1, 2009) (“The
Council supports the harmonization of HHS and FTC rules as it would provide HIPAA
covered entities and PHR related entities with a consistent set of rules within which to work.”).
But see Chamber of Com. Of the U.S., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Require
Registration of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940
(Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/dhirschmann091504.pdf.
214 healthITnow.org, Comment Letter on Health Breach Notification Rule at 2 (June 1, 2009).
215 WedMD, Comment Letter on Health Breach Notification Rule at 2 (June 1, 2009).
216
Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 FR 42740, 42743.
217 See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
218 At the same time, the agencies took care to note that their regulations were “not identical
to ED's regulations” in every respect. See 64 FR 58569-58572 (emphasis added). For example,
they noted, “the common rule includes modifications to be consistent with Supreme Court
precedent and statutory changes that are not yet reflected in the Department of Education’s
regulations. In addition . . . the participating agencies have made a few additional revisions to
the common rule in response to public comments.” See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex
in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 65 FR 52858-01
(2000).
219 See McGarity, supra note 176 at 26-28 (describing ossification).
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turn, could be spent addressing more urgent or high-priority tasks within the
agency.
While there are many reasons to celebrate the reuse of regulatory text, there
are risks to consider as well. The most obvious is the temptation for drafters to
use templates without sufficiently tailoring them; as a result, agencies could
promulgate regulations that are ill-fitting to the specific regulatory issue at hand.
One striking illustration from abroad can be found in Argentina’s hazardous
waste regulations.220 They are verbatim copies of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s rules—including their internal cross-references to the
obviously-inapplicable U.S. Code.221 The cross-references in particular suggest
that Argentina was merely importing language without considering the unique
demands of the country or its specific legal authorities.
It is difficult to find such clear examples of rote copying among U.S.
agencies. One possible explanation is that the practice is more subtle among
American agencies, without obvious giveaways like irrelevant cross-references.
Absent such evidence, it would be difficult for outside observers to judge
whether regulatory diffusion was the result of thoughtless imitation. Another
possibility is that few examples of careless borrowing, if any, actually exist. The
notice-and-comment process could make it especially difficult for agencies to
adopt language without adequate justification.222 Rulewriters eager to avoid
litigation risk would avoid importing language from other agencies without
careful thought.223
That said, public comments have criticized agencies for reusing regulatory
texts without sufficiently adapting them. For example, a number of agencies
reused language from a DOJ template regarding nondiscrimination on the basis
of handicaps.224 During the rulemaking, a commenter argued that the “agency
should have tailored the regulation to its particular programs and activities
instead of adopting the Justice Department's prototype.”225 The agencies rejected
this criticism.226 Regardless of whether this choice was justified, only a fraction
of agency rulemakings are challenged in court,227 thus mitigating the check that
arbitrariness review provides. As a result, the risk of reflexive regulatory
220

See Miller, supra note 3, at 846.
Id.
222 See infra note 233-36 and accompanying text.
223 See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 174, at 164 (discussing how “litigation” after public
comments “has a profound effect on the rulemaking programs of many agencies”).
224 51 FR 4566-01, 4567; 51 FR 22880-01, 22881.
225 51 FR 22880-01, 22881; 51 FR 4566, 4567.
226 51 FR 22880-01, 22881; 51 FR 4566, 4567.
227 For example, from 1988 to 1990 only thirteen of the twenty-eight significant hazardous
waste rules from the Environmental Protection Agency were challenged and reviewed
in court. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in
the Regulatory Process, 30 L.&SOC’YREV.735, 742 (1996).
221
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borrowing remains real — especially when there are time and resource
constraints.
There are other costs of regulatory diffusion as well. One is the stifling of
policy innovation. Instead of studying a problem anew amidst updated
information, a borrowing agency in the name of consistency could instead freeze
into place an outdated or ill-considered approach. In other words, instead of
serving as “laboratories of democracy,”228 agencies could thwart experimentation
by merely copying existing texts. Falling into line too quickly could, in turn,
grant outsize influence to the agency that simply promulgated its regulation first.
Perhaps the agency was first because it drafted its regulation in haste. Or because
it happened to confront the regulatory problem earlier. All of these scenarios
would result in non-optimal rules that then proliferate through the mechanisms
of diffusion. Finally, to the extent that diffusion reflects the work of interest
groups, the phenomenon grants private entities an outsized role in rulemaking.
As a result, binding rules are written with little transparency or accountability.
Whether the benefits of regulatory diffusion ultimately outweigh the costs is
an empirical question that our analysis does not shed light upon. Among other
things, that assessment would require data on the burdens avoided through
standardized language; the benefits of the policies diffused; the costs saved by
agency drafters; and the impacts of alternative activities agencies were able to
address with those resources saved, among other factors. If an aggregate
assessment of the practice of text reuse is exceedingly difficult, perhaps there is
some value to having agencies themselves make this assessment on a case-bycase basis. The law could force these self-assessments by requiring agencies to
internalize the social costs of sloppy drafting choices. The threat of external
review would serve as an ex ante check on unjustified borrowing.
One natural question is to what extent they should be required to explain
those reasons to facilitate oversight. Agencies already possess incentives under
existing law to cite and justify their work. Reason-giving, for example, is a
component of arbitrariness review under the APA.229 While this standard is often

228

See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and
Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 898 (2006) (encouraging agencies to experiment with
e-rulemaking as “laboratories of democracy”); Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal
Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1173 (2018) (noting that “federal
agencies may be much more promising crucibles of experimental reform” such that
“laboratories of democracy may be intertwined with, or largely outside of, the structures of
federalism”).
229 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2009) (describing the “reason-giving requirement of arbitrary
and capricious review”).
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described as a judicial “hard look,”230 in practice, courts are fairly deferential,231
in particular to an agency’s “drafting decisions”232 Given the possibility that
regulatory borrowing could reflect the mindless use of a template, however, it
might be tempting to argue that courts should apply a stricter standard of review.
In this view, more scrutiny is necessary to evaluate why an agency made its
drafting choices.
A major concern with this proposal, however, is that judges are particularly
ill-suited to this task. A limited number have worked in agencies, let alone the
executive branch more broadly.233 Regulatory drafters, by contrast, have
experience administering rules and therefore better appreciate the tradeoffs
involved in drafting them — especially when such tradeoffs involve resource
constraints.234 Judges, moreover, lack manageable standards for reviewing these
choices: how much or how little explanation is enough? The resulting
uncertainties, in turn, would result in ossification as agencies now have to spend
230

See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52
(D.C. Cir. 1970). Under this standard, courts apply a “hard look” to agency decisions: to
interrogate whether the agency improperly relied on extra-statutory factors; failed to consider
an important angle; proffered a rationale that conflicted with the evidence in the record; or
generally failed to apply its expertise. See Lion Oil Co. v. E.P.A., 792 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir.
2015) (An “[a]gency decision is ‘arbitrary or capricious’ if agency has relied on factors that
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider important aspect of
problem, offered explanation for its decision that runs counter to evidence before agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to difference in view or product of agency
expertise).
231 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355,
1358 (2016) (finding that “since October Term 1982 , . . the Court has passed on the merits of
arbitrariness challenges sixty-four times” and, of those, “agencies have lost arbitrary and
capricious challenges only five times--a remarkable win-rate of 92 percent.”). Agencies rarely
lose on arbitrariness grounds in the lower courts as well. Id. at 1367 (observing that “agencies
rarely lose on arbitrariness grounds in the courts of appeals” and “interpret[ing] that empirical
regularity to suggest that the Supreme Court is directing the lower courts to utilize a thinner
form of rationality review, one that requires merely that the agency's decision not be pure
caprice.”).
232 See, e.g., In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., 983 F.3d 1239, 1262–63 (11th Cir.
2020) (“Our deference extends both to an agency's ultimate findings as well as [to] drafting
decisions like how much discussion to include on each topic, and how much data is necessary
to fully address each issue.”).
233 See Thomas J. Miles, Racial Disparities in Wiretap Applications Before Federal Judges,
41 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 431 (2012) (observing that “[a]bout 19 percent of [federal district]
judges [in sample] had previously worked in the legislative or executive branches of state
government, and with respect to the federal government, about 16 percent had previously
worked in the legislative branch or in nonprosecutorial positions in the executive branch”).
234 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 231, at 1395 (“It is often rational, indeed optimal, to
not spend the time gathering information so that a clear rational connection exists between
particular facts and the particular choice made, because that would require sacrificing the
benefits of expedition.”).
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resources papering over their drafting choices. In addition, heightened review
would have chilling effects on text reuse when the benefits of the practice —
e.g., increased coordination, standardization, learning — are likely to be
substantial.
Given these concerns, a better alternative would be to leave oversight to
other executive branch actors who appreciate the kinds of considerations
necessary when drafting rules. One candidate would be the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).235 Agencies covered by executive order are
required to submit proposed and final rules to OIRA for review.236 One of the
review’s explicit purposes is to ensure that a rule does not “create a serious
inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another
agency.”237 As a result, agencies must already explain how their rules are
consistent with those of others during the OIRA review process. As part of this
process, OIRA could also issue guidance requiring that agencies explain more
broadly why they borrow regulatory texts from other agencies. To reduce the
potential burdens, those explanations could occur verbally in intra-executive
branch deliberations, instead of appearing in formal, published rule preambles.238
B.

Interpreting Similar Regulations

Diffusion also implicates questions of regulatory interpretation. In this
context, the main question is whether similar rules should be interpreted
similarly. Indeed, rules, no less than statutes or contracts, require interpretation.
Agencies regularly interpret their own rules—when enforcing them, adjudicating
them, or providing guidance on what they mean.239 Until recently, those views
gained much respect from reviewing judges.240 As long as not “plainly
erroneous” or “inconsistent” with the regulation, the agency’s understanding was
More precisely, any agency that is not a statutorily-defined “independent regulatory
agency” must submit regulatory actions to OIRA for review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994) (defining an “agency” as under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) and
excluding those agencies specified in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10)); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L.
Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1261, 1264
(2006).
235

Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994). As for independent agencies
not covered by this executive order, other coordinating bodies such as FSOC could serve a
similar OIRA-like role.
237Id.
238 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1857 (2013) (explaining OIRA’s role in facilitating
interagency discussion through meetings).
239 See Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 669, 672 (2015) (“Administrative agencies frequently offer interpretations of their own
regulations, whether in adjudicative decisions, guidance documents, the preambles to the
regulations, opinion letters, or briefs.”).
240 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019).
236
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entitled to “controlling weight”— a standard known as Auer deference.241 Some
courts understood Auer as demanding even more deference than that given to
statutes.242 Courts often defended the doctrine on the grounds that agencies were
better positioned to understand why a rule was drafted the way it was.243
Alternatively, agency deference was a sensible interpretive presumption about
congressional intent given agencies’ comparative expertise.244 As a result, judges
often gave regulations cursory glances before blithely adopting the agency’s
view.245
No longer. In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court demanded greater judicial
skepticism.246 Declining to overrule Auer, Justice Kagan, writing for the
majority, nevertheless sought to “reinforce [the] limits” of the doctrine and to
explain how it was “cabined in its scope.”247 First, she clarified that the doctrine
only applied when “the character and context” of the agency’s interpretation
entitled it to deference.248 For example, the interpretation must represent the
agency’s high-level “official position,” rather than an informal ruling by staff. It
must also exhibit the agency’s expertise and “considered judgment.”249 If these
conditions are satisfied, an agency’s “reasonable” views are eligible for
deference.250
Whether deference will be granted depends on whether the judge, using
interpretive tools, can disambiguate the regulation at issue. In Justice Kagan’s
words, “the possibility of deference can arise only if a regulation is . . . genuinely
ambiguous, even after a court has resorted to all the standard tools of

241

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (2019) (“Some courts have thought (perhaps because of Seminole
Rock’s “plainly erroneous” formulation that at this stage of the analysis, agency constructions
of rules receive greater deference than agency constructions of statutes.”).
243 Id. at 2412 (noting that “the agency that promulgated a rule is in the ‘better position [to]
reconstruct’ its original meaning.”).
244 Id. (“We have explained Auer deference (as we now call it) as rooted in a presumption
about congressional intent—a presumption that Congress would generally want the agency to
play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities”). See also id. at 2413 (noting that
“[a]gencies (unlike courts) have “unique expertise,” often of a scientific or technical nature,
relevant to applying a regulation “to complex or changing circumstances.”).
245 Id. at 2414 (acknowledging that “[a]t times, this Court has applied Auer deference without
significant analysis of the underlying regulation”).
246 Id. at 2416.
247 Id. at 2408.
248
Id. at 2416.
249 Id. at 2417.
250 Id. at 2415-16 (“If genuine ambiguity remains, moreover, the agency's reading must still
be ‘reasonable,’ [i]n other words, it must come within the zone of ambiguity the court has
identified after employing all its interpretive tools.” (citations omitted)).
242
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interpretation.”251 Put differently, judges cannot just “reflexive[ly]”252 capitulate
to the agency’s interpretation, but rather consider the “text, structure, history,
and purpose of a regulation” just as they would have had there been no agency
to rely upon.253
Consequently, judges will now have to grapple with regulatory
interpretation on its own terms. Basic questions remain unsettled. What is the
relevant “text”? Does it consist only of the text codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations or does it also include the preamble?254 If a judge decides to look to
regulatory purpose or intent, to what sources should she turn?255 More broadly,
is regulatory history (analagous to legislative history) a valid source of
interpretation?256 All of these questions demand answers unique to the regulatory
context. Commenters and courts can no longer blindly import insights from the
statutory realm.257
The most relevant inquiry for our purposes is whether there is a valid role
here for canons of interpretation. Interpretive canons are “rules of thumb,” often
deployed in the statutory context, which judges deploy to ascertain meaning.258
Consider in particular the in pari materia canon, the notion that similar statutes
251

Id. at 2414.
Id. at 2415 (quoting Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
253 Id. at 2415.
254 Compare Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 Duke L.J. 81, 138 (2015). (“The
regulatory text alone is published in the Code of Federal Regulations, an important legal
touchstone for determining whether an agency has issued a substantive, legislative rule.”) with
Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 407 (2012) (suggesting
“that both regulatory text and the regulation's statement of basis and purpose count as part of
the ‘text’ on which a textualist should center her interpretive inquiry”). See also id. at
360–61 (referring to a regulatory “preamble” as the agency’s published “detailed explanation
of the grounds and purposes of the regulation, called a ‘statement of basis and purpose’”).
255 See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 280-82 (2000); Nou, supra note 254, at 84-86 (2015);
Stack, supra note 254, at 358-60 (2012); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of
Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CINN. L. REV. 681, 708-17 (1984).
256 See Noah, supra note 255, at 306-07 (identifying as possible sources of regulatory history
“the preamble accompanying the final rule, regulatory analyses of various sorts prepared in
tandem with promulgation of the final rule, notices of proposed rulemaking and similar
published documents, internal agency memoranda, and even the recollections of persons
involved in the formulation of the rule”).
257 See id. at 282 (noting that “it is far easier to ascribe an intent to an agency when it issues a
rule than to a legislature when it enacts a statute, both because of differences in their
decisionmaking routines and because of the greater reliability of the materials that document
the bases for their decisions”).
258 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (“Canons of construction, however, are
simply ‘rules of thumb’ which will sometimes ‘help courts determine the meaning of
legislation.’” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992))).
252
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should be interpreted similarly.259 The rule — literally meaning “in the same
matter” — encourages courts confronting an ambiguous statute to look at another
statute on the same subject. In the Supreme Court’s formulation:
The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers[e] statutes relate to the same thing,
they ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them . . . . If a
thing contained in a subsequent statute, be within the reason of a former statute, it
shall be taken to be within the meaning of that statute.260

Some courts justify the canon in terms of legislative intent, a “presum[ption] that
Congress intended th[e] text to have the same meaning in both statutes” absent
evidence to the contrary.261 Others ground the canon in a kind of legal
pragmatism, which calls for judges to rationalize the law and consider its
consequences.262 In this view, when two different statutes bear on similar
subjects and use similar language, the role of the court is to interpret them so as
not to functionally conflict.263
In the statutory context, however, some have argued that the canon is
inappropriate given the “structural separation” of Congress into committees,
which do not communicate with each other.264 Put differently, committees with
disparate jurisdictions often do their work in “siloes.”265 These realities “pose[]
a perhaps insurmountable obstacle to the accuracy of assumptions of linguistic
consistency.”266 Courts and commenters alike also express skepticism that
statutes should be read as if Congress actually sought consistency, whether

259

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 105 (1994). See also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
*60 n.8 (Edward Christian ed., 14th ed. 1803) (“It is an established rule of construction that
statutes in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be construed with reference to each
other.”).
260 Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United
States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-65 (1845)).
261 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
262 See Anuj C. Desai, The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
177, 193-94 (2020).
263 Id. at 183.
264 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURT: CRISIS AND REFORM 277 (1985) (expressing
skepticism over linguistic canons since they are premised on “wholly unrealistic conceptions
of the legislative process”); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the
Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 202-03 (2017).
265 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-an
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 747–48 (2014) (observing “how the division of Congress into committees creates
drafting ‘silos’ that exacerbate drafting fragmentation and also ‘turf’ consciousness that
incentivizes drafting to protect jurisdiction”).
266 Id.
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linguistic or policy-oriented, across time.267 Maxims to read statutes coherently,
in this view, are naive about the extent to which legislative drafters are aware of
different parts of the same statute or the U.S. Code.268
The picture, however, looks different in the administrative state, where
disparate rulemakers from distinct agencies regularly communicate and
coordinate with one another.269 As previously discussed, OIRA reviews rules
from executive agencies to ensure they do not “create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency.”270 In
other words, OIRA helps to promote coherence, whether on textual or policy
grounds, between regulations from different executive agencies. At least for
significant rules issued by these executive agencies, then, a presumption that
regulations should be read coherently arguably has an empirical grounding.
Maybe a more general way to think about a regulatory in pari materia canon is
as a way to vindicate the executive branch’s own explicit desire for coherence.
Beyond centralized coordination, agencies also regularly interact with each
other through formal and informal means. As discussed, they can enter into
memoranda of understanding, form working groups, and informal gettogethers.271 While it is true that agencies can be more fragmented than
congressional committees are, the executive branch as a whole possesses more
coordinating mechanisms than Congress does.272 Moreover, since agencies
actually implement the regulations that they write — unlike Congress with
respect to statutes — they are likely to be more familiar with the relevant sections
of the Code of Federal Regulations than Congress is with the U.S. Code. As a
result, agencies are better positioned to draft with an eye to consistency.
Another broader source for the norm comes from the APA’s prohibition
against arbitrary agency action.273 Non-arbitrariness requires policy coherence,

See, e.g., K.L. v. Rhode Island Bd. of Educ., 907 F.3d 639, 646 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[T]he
notion that Congress, acting on legislation separated by forty years and addressing different
subjects, would be attentive to the consistent usage of a phrase, reflects a fanciful version of
the legislative drafting process.”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside-an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and
the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 936 (2013) (noting that statutory drafters
“vigorously disputed that the first cousin of the whole act rule — the “whole code rule,” under
which courts construe terms across different statutes consistently— reflects how Congress
drafts or even how it tries to draft”).
268 Id.
269 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37.
267

270

Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(2), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993).

271

See supra notes 40, 123-126 and accompanying text.
See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 267 (comparing Office of the Legislative Counsel with
OIRA and noting that the former “does not appear to have the reach, the convening power, or
even the consistency of practice to coordinate Congress's drafting process”).
273 5 U.S.C. § 706.
272

56

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

which arguably requires attention to the possibility of interagency conflict.274
This is particularly true when commenters raise concerns about inconsistent
regulations across agencies, which occurs often.275 When it does, agencies have
a duty to consider them.276 For all these reasons, reading regulations in pari
materia arguably makes more sense in the regulatory, than statutory, context.
Indeed, parties have sometimes asked judges to apply the canon to
regulations—not always by name but by invoking the idea that similarly-worded
regulations should be interpreted consistently.277 Faced with this prospect, some
judges have applied the canon, with little discussion about its appropriateness in
the regulatory context.278 Others have asked for supplemental briefing on the
question, feeling lost on how to approach it.279 Given the previous regime of
strong deference, there were few precedents for them to analyze.280 Post-Kisor,
however, judges will be confronted more often with calls to read regulations in
pari materia. This is especially true given our finding that the number of
substantially similar rules has been increasing over time, as has the number of
agencies engaged in textual borrowing.
Whether and when the principle makes sense in the rulemaking context
depends on its perceived logic and maps onto broader debates about regulatory
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Fed. Bureau of Prisons Fed. Corr. Complex Coleman, Fla. v.
Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 737 F.3d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (declaring that “pursuant to arbitrary
and capricious review, if an agency’s ‘explanation for its determination . . . lacks any
coherence,’ a court owes ‘no deference to [the agency's] purported expertise’” (quoting Tripoli
Rocketry Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 437 F.3d 75, 77
(D.C. Cir. 2006))).
275 See, e.g., Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,960, 29,964 (May 13, 2016) (describing
commenters that “overwhelmingly urged the Commission to harmonize its external business
conduct rules with those of the CFTC”).
276 See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir.
1977).
277 See, e.g., Big Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063, 1071 (6th Cir. 2013); ATK Thiokol,
Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 1329, 1334-36 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108
F.3d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); First Am. Bank v. RBS Citizens, N.A., No. 14 c
8120, 2015 WL 3919588, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2015); United States. v. Moesser, No.
2:09-CR-842 TS, 2010 WL 4811945 *6-9 (D. Utah Nov. 19, 2010); United States v. Biocic,
730 F. Supp. 1364, 1365 (D. Md. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1991).
278 See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 872 F.3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2017) (“It is a hornbook
principle of interpretation that when ‘two provisions operate in pari materia,’ they ‘should not
be read in isolation,’ but must be construed together.” (quoting United States v. Onick 889
F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1989))).
279 In United States v. Moesser, for example, the judge asked for briefing specifically on the
issue of reading regulations in pari materia from different agencies. See Moesser, 2010 WL
4811945, at *1, *7.
280 The Moesser briefing, for example, only turned up two cases directly supporting reading
regulations in pari materia. Id. at *7 (citing United States v. Biocic, 730 F.Supp. 1364 (D. Md.
1990), and United States v. Olesen, 196 F.Supp. 688 (S.D. Cal. 1961)).
274
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interpretation, which will not be resolved here. Suffice to say that the textualist
judge would likely focus on linguistic coherence, reading the text of the two
regulations as though they were one.281 This judge would apply textualist canons
such as the rule to avoid redundancy or presumption of consistent usage (giving
the same words the same meaning) to maintain the textual integrity of the similar
regulations. By contrast, a more pragmatic, purposivist judge would focus on
policy coherence, ensuring that both regulations are read so as not to functionally
conflict.282 On this view, the in pari materia canon seeks to resolve any policy
conflicts between the two statutes, to make the overall statutory scheme work or
“make sense” together.283
In this manner, the in pari materia canon would operate in different ways
depending on one’s approach to regulatory interpretation more generally. Those
diverging orientations would also help inform another question that judges
would need to confront: Which regulations are appropriate to read against each
other? In other words, which rules are “similar enough” to warrant application
of the canon?284 The textualist judge is unlikely to deploy the technical
methodology used here as a metric for similarity.285 Nor should she: While that
approach sought to operationalize a general search for regulatory texts that
drafters had likely used as a model or template, judges will have the benefit of
briefing and discovery in specific cases to be able to make those determinations
with more information.
Conversely, a more purposivist judge would likely have to determine
whether two candidate regulations implicated the same policy, rather than
sharing similar texts. These judges could rely on more institutional proxies such
as whether the two rules were coordinated by another entity such as OIRA or
were borne of the same working group. If so, then a more accountable actor has
determined that the two regulations at issue merit some kind of policy

Cf., Desai, supra note 262, at 183 (describing the in pari materia doctrine’s “treating the
two statutes as one” as “harmonizing the statutes linguistically” (quoting Teles AG v. Kappos,
846 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111-14 (D.D.C. 2012)).
282 Id. See generally Stack, supra note 254, at 383-408 (describing the “Purposive Technique”
of statutory interpretation).
283 Id. (describing approach as effort by courts to “harmonize to ‘make sense’ of the two
statutes together”).
284 Cf. Desai, supra note 262, at 184 (analogously exploring “the determination of whether
two statutes are in pari materia” which must be “answered in the affirmative” before “the court
can then treat the two statutes as one”). Desai further explains that:
Courts have no analytical tools for determining when two statutes are on the same
subject. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the determination is made
intuitively and may well be made after the judge has decided how the statute should
ultimately be interpreted. In other words, it seems likely that the determination is
not in fact one of the levers of decision, but is instead a results-oriented fig leaf.
Id.
285 See supra Part I.A.2.
281
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consistency. A court could then act as a faithful agent of the drafting bodies and
apply the in pari materia canon accordingly.
Conclusion
Regulations diffuse across agencies and over time. This Article has explored
how and why they do so. Specifically, it has operationalized the idea of text reuse
between administrative agencies using methods of text analysis. The empirical
results suggest that regulatory diffusion is increasing over time and through a
broader network of agencies. These patterns suggest mechanisms of coordination
between agencies that are more informal in nature than the current literature’s
understanding of interagency coordination might otherwise suggest. Moreover,
these findings heighten the importance of debates over regulatory interpretation,
at a time when the Supreme Court is calling upon judges to read regulations with
less deference.
More broadly, this work has sought to open up further lines of inquiry
regarding regulatory drafting and policy diffusion more broadly. Indeed, many
research questions remain: What other aspects of agency variation explain
differences in diffusion patterns? Are there, for example, significant differences
due to regulatory subject matter: perhaps national-security-related agencies
exhibit more diffusion than others? Is it possible to observe the influence of
interest groups on drafting decisions through notice-and-comment? While
administrative law has paid more attention to the ways in which agencies
interact, further study of their underlying networks and patterns of behavior may
continue to reveal new insights on the levers of administrative influence and
power.
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Appendix
Detailed Description of Similarity Measure
Our goal is to identify all texts that are textually similar. Most existing
measures of textual similarity compare texts pairwise. In a dataset of 𝑛 texts,
𝑛(𝑛−1)
there are
to be made. In our application, since 𝑛 = 651,164, comparing
2
each paragraph to each other paragraph would require 212 billion comparisons.
This is computationally infeasible, regardless of which algorithm is used. Hence,
instead of comparing every document to every other document, we rely on recent
methodological advancements in big data analysis to identify similar documents
probabilistically.286
In particular, we follow Leskovec et al.287 and use two tricks to
drastically simplify the problem of identifying text reuse: minhashing and
locality sensitivity hashing. An example illustrates the approach. Consider the
following two texts:
TEXT A: Contemporaneous record means any document created at the time
of the event.
TEXT B: Current Record means any writing created at the time of the event.
We first convert each text to “shingled k-grams” with 𝑘 = 5. An n-gram is
simply a collection of 𝑛 consecutive words. Shingling means that the 𝑛-grams
consist of overlapping, contiguous sequences. For instance, in the above
example, TEXT A and TEXT B can be expressed as the following shingles:

286

For an overview, see generally JURE LESKOVEC, ANAND RAJARAMAN & JEFFREY DAVID
ULLMAN, MINING OF MASSIVE DATA SETS 81-91 (2014) (discussing efficient ways to compute
document similarities for large corpora).
287 Id. at 76-86.
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Text

Shingle #

Words

A

1

contemporaneous
document

A

2

record means any document created

A

3

means any document created at

A

4

any document created at the

A

5

document created at the time

A

6

created at the time of

A

7

at the time of the

A

8

the time of the event

B

1

current record means any writing

B

2

record means any writing created

B

3

means any writing created at

B

4

any writing created at the

B

5

writing created at the time

B

6

created at the time of

B

7

at the time of the

B

8

the time of the event

record means

any

Generally, a text consisting of 𝑛 words can be represented as 𝑛 − 𝑘 + 1
shingles. Here, both texts have 12 words and can be represented as 8 shingles.
We then compute the Jaccard similarity, which divides the number of
overlapping shingles by the total number of unique shingles. Here, that fraction
is
𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) =

3
= 23%
13
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This simple exercise is helpful in illustrating two characteristics of our
approach. First, the 𝑘 in 𝑘-grams shingling can be thought of as a threshold that
determines the number of consecutive words that need to be identical between
the two texts in order for them to “count” as text reuse. For instance, if we set
𝑘 = 2, any identical sequence of two words will count as text reuse. Naturally,
small values of 𝑘 will lead to many false positives.288 Similarly, if 𝑘 is set too
high, the results may include many false negatives.289 Second, while the measure
is sensitive to textual similarity, it is not sensitive to semantic similarity. Indeed,
dependent on the context, the words “document” and “writing” may be highly
semantically similar. However, the use of the word “document” in TEXT A and
of “writing” in TEXT B breaks the chain of consecutive words, yielding a low
textual similarity.
Computing 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) exactly, while generally workable, is
computationally expensive for longer texts. Assume, for instance, that TEXT A
and TEXT B contain a total of 1,000 unique shingles. Computing 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) exactly
would require a comparison of all 1,000 unique shingles. For long texts, rather
than computing 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) exactly, we approximate it with 360 independent random
̂
draws from all shingles, yielding an estimate of 𝐽(𝐴,
𝐵) with a standard error of
290
approximately 0.06.
To further increase computational efficiency, we rely on a minHashing
procedure. A hash function 𝐻(𝑥) maps shingles into fixed, pseudorandom
numerical hash values.291 Hence, translating shingles into hashes and choosing
the hash value with the smallest number is equivalent to choosing a shingle at
random. The advantage in operating with hash values, rather than shingles, is
that computers are extremely efficient in computing hash values. Hence, through
repeated minHashing with randomly chosen hash functions, we can achieve an
̂
estimate of 𝐽(𝐴,
𝐵) at low computational cost.
So far, we have discussed efficient ways to obtain an estimated, pairwise
text similarity. As mentioned above, however, our full dataset contains over 200
billion unique pairs. Even with the efficiency gains obtained through
minHashing, making all comparisons is still infeasible. We thus rely on locality
sensitive hashing to further reduce the computational burden. Intuitively, the
goal of local sensitivity hashing (LSH) is to divide texts into buckets in a way
such that similar texts are likely to be assigned the same bucket, whereas
dissimilar texts are likely assigned to different buckets. Then only texts in the
same bucket are compared to each other pairwise. LSH achieves this goal during
For instance, in the two sentences “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog” and “I
just quickly read over the document,” there is overlap in the words “over the.” However, it is
unlikely that a human would assume that text has been reused.
289
Consider the 20-word sentence “Welcome, my name is Kim and I will be your guide today.
I sincerely hope you will enjoy the tour.” Under 𝑘 = 20, a second sentence that replaces
“Kim” with “Tim” would be considered as not reusing any text.
288

290

i.e. if 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) = 0.2, the estimated mean of lies in [0.14, 0.26] 95% of the time.
The probability that two shingles containing different words are translated into the same
hash value is virtually zero.
291
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the hashing process. Assume that each text is represented by 𝑚 hash values.
These 𝑚 hash values can be broken into 𝑛 bands, such that each band includes
𝑚
rows. Each band is then hashed to a bucket. All documents with bands assigned
𝑛
to overlapping buckets are then compared to one another.
To illustrate on our example above, assume that we draw 6 random shingles
with replacement from TEXT A and TEXT B. We represent these shingles as
hash values. Next, we divide each set of 6 random shingles into 3 bands, where
each band includes two shingles. For instance, the three bands for TEXT A could
contain [[𝐴1, 𝐴3 ], [𝐴2 , 𝐴8 ], [𝐴6 , 𝐴7 ]] and the three bands for TEXT B could
contain [[𝐵3 , 𝐵4 ], [𝐵1 , 𝐵4 ], [𝐵6 , 𝐵7 ]]. The bands would then be hashed into
buckets. Because the bands [𝐴6 , 𝐴7 ] and [𝐵6 , 𝐵7 ] include identical shingles, they
get hashed into the same bucket, making TEXT A and TEXT B a candidate for
̂
estimating the pairwise Jaccard Similarity, 𝐽(𝐴,
𝐵). In contrast, if TEXT A and
̂
TEXT B do not contain the same band, 𝐽(𝐴,
𝐵) will not be computed.
The example above is stylized. In practice, the number of hash values 𝑚 and
the number of bands 𝑛 are much larger. It is helpful to understand, however, that
LSH is a probabilistic process. In particular, if two documents have only few
identical shingles (i.e. they are dissimilar), it is unlikely that their Jaccard
Similarity will be estimated, because they will not share any hash-values, and
thus will never appear in the same bucket. In contrast, if two documents share
many shingles (i.e., they are very similar), it is likely that their Jaccard similarity
will be computed. Indeed, for a given combination of parameters 𝑚 and 𝑛, it is
possible to compute the probability that the Jaccard similarity for two documents
will be computed pairwise as a function of their similarity. After manual
inspection of our results, we determined that it can be virtually ruled out that two
documents have reused the same text if their Jaccard similarity is less than 0.5.
We thus set 𝑚 and 𝑛 such that it is very likely for us to compare documents
pairwise if their Jaccard Similarity is at least 0.5.

63

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4027009

Figure A.1. Probability of Detection over Jaccard Similarity

Figure A.1 above depicts the probability that we detect and explicitly
compare two texts as a function of their Jaccard Similarity for our parameters of
choice (𝑚 = 120 and 𝑛 = 40). It shows that, at our threshold of 0.5, the
probability that we compute the Jaccard similarity specifically is 1. This means
that we are confident that our dataset contains all pairs of texts with a Jaccard
similarity of 0.5 and above. In order to implement the above techniques, we rely
on the text reuse package in R.292

Detailed Description of Weighted Leadership Scores
To assign leadership scores, we cannot simply add up the number of times
an agency’s regulatory text is reused by another agency. Doing so would overcount pairs in situations where an agency copies texts reused by multiple
agencies before it. To understand why, imagine that, in the year 2005, agency 𝐴2
reuses text from 𝐴1. Then, in the year 2010, 𝐴3 reuses that same text. Our dataset
will contain three pairs: {𝐴1 , 𝐴2 }, {𝐴1 , 𝐴3 } and {𝐴2 , 𝐴3 }. Note, however, that 𝐴3
appears in two observations, even though it copied the text only once in 2010.
Instead, the most intuitive approach is to divide the leadership score between
the preceding agencies. To illustrate, imagine that, in the year 2005, agency 𝐴2
reuses text from 𝐴1. Then, in the year 2010, 𝐴3 reuses that same text. It is most
likely that 𝐴3 used the text from either 𝐴1 or 𝐴2, but not of both.

292

Lincoln Mullen, Textreuse: Detect Text Reuse and Document Similarity. R Package
Version 0.1.4, TEXTREUSE (2016), https://lincolnmullen.com/software/textreuse/.
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When determining the leading agencies in the network, it thus appears
appropriate to assign lower weight to the pairs {𝐴1 , 𝐴3 } and {𝐴2 , 𝐴3 }. To explain
our weighting approach intuitively, assume that each instance of text reuse is
worth one “leadership point” that the borrowing agency assigns to the agency it
borrowed text from. In the above example, we assign equal weight of 0.5 to both
{𝐴1 , 𝐴3 } and {𝐴2 , 𝐴3 }. This is synonymous with distributing the “leadership
point” of 𝐴3 equally between 𝐴1 and 𝐴2. There are two substantive
interpretations of our weighting approach. First, one could assume that 𝐴3 used
the text from either 𝐴1 or 𝐴2, but not of both. Because we are not able to observe
whom 𝐴3 copied from, we assign the leadership point equally among the two
lending agencies. Otherwise, one could also assume that 𝐴3 used both the text of
𝐴1 and 𝐴2 as a template. However, we would still need to weight the pairs down
in which 𝐴3 appears, because otherwise, agencies that borrow text later would
arbitrarily have more leadership points to distribute than agencies that appear
earlier.
For instance, in our example, 𝐴2 would assign a single leadership point to
𝐴1, whereas 𝐴3 would assign a point both to 𝐴1 and 𝐴2. Although this does not
affect the relative ordering of leadership agencies within a single, reused
paragraph, it is problematic when comparing agency influence across multiple
instances of text reuse. In a first step, all agencies within a joint rulemaking are
treated as a single agency. Whatever share they of the leadership point they
receive is then distributed equally across them. As such, each agency within a
1 1
joint rule receives 𝑛 ∗ 𝑘 leadership points, where 𝑛 − 1 is the number of lending
agencies outside the joint rule and 𝑘 is the number of agencies participating in
the joint rule. Similarly, all agencies within a joint rule can only distribute a
single leadership point.
Having thus defined our weighting scheme, we calculate each agency’s
“leadership score” as an expression for how often others borrow that agencies’
text. In other words, the numbers reflect how many of the agency’s regulatory
paragraphs appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
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Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A.2: Classifier Performance, Substantive Paragraph
Accuracy

𝐹1

AUC
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Figure A.3: Classifier Performance, Procedural Paragraph
Accuracy

𝐹1

AUC
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Table A.1: Top Ten Agencies by Regulatory Activity
This table indicates the most active agencies, as measured by the total
number of paragraphs promulgated by it during our period of observation.
Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of the Treasury
Department of Agriculture
Department of Transportation
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Commerce
Department of the Interior
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Labor
Department of Defense

Relative
Scores
84,284
84,172
55,934
48,591
48,198
42,469
42,087
38,478
33,268
32,525

Leadership

Table A.2: Summary of Paired Dataset
Unit
Inter-Agency
Joint Rulemaking
Republished
Procedural

0
257,388
(55%)
211,185
(45%)
445,402
(95%)
431,674
(92%)

1
210,052
(45%)
256,255
(55%)
22,038
(5%)
35,766
(8%)
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Table A.3: Top Five Agencies by Relative Leadership Score
This table indicates relative leadership scores. It divides the absolute
leadership scores depicted in Table 3 by the amount of regulatory activity for
each agency.

Agency
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence
in
National
Environmental
Policy
Foundation
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation
National Mediation Board

Relative
Scores
1.26
0.95

Leadership

0.8
0.55
0.47
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